Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods

✓ LOW ✓ MODERATE ✓ HIGH
2 Enhancements 1 Overlay 13 Related Controls
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Requirements NIST SOURCE

Employ the following acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods to protect against, identify, and mitigate supply chain risks: [strategies, tools, and methods].

Discussion (NIST Supplemental Guidance)

The use of the acquisition process provides an important vehicle to protect the supply chain. There are many useful tools and techniques available, including obscuring the end use of a system or system component, using blind or filtered buys, requiring tamper-evident packaging, or using trusted or controlled distribution. The results from a supply chain risk assessment can guide and inform the strategies, tools, and methods that are most applicable to the situation. Tools and techniques may provide protections against unauthorized production, theft, tampering, insertion of counterfeits, insertion of malicious software or backdoors, and poor development practices throughout the system development life cycle. Organizations also consider providing incentives for suppliers who implement controls, promote transparency into their processes and security and privacy practices, provide contract language that addresses the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit components, and restrict purchases from untrustworthy suppliers. Organizations consider providing training, education, and awareness programs for personnel regarding supply chain risk, available mitigation strategies, and when the programs should be employed. Methods for reviewing and protecting development plans, documentation, and evidence are commensurate with the security and privacy requirements of the organization. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.

Enhancements NIST SOURCE

SR-5(1) Adequate Supply LOW MODERATE HIGH

Employ the following controls to ensure an adequate supply of [critical system components]: [controls].

Discussion

Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by disrupting the supply of critical system components or corrupting supplier operations. Organizations may track systems and component mean time to failure to mitigate the loss of temporary or permanent system function. Controls to ensure that adequate supplies of critical system components include the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for the identified critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar components that may be used, if necessary.

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SR-5(2) Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update LOW MODERATE HIGH

Assess the system, system component, or system service prior to selection, acceptance, modification, or update.

Discussion

Organizational personnel or independent, external entities conduct assessments of systems, components, products, tools, and services to uncover evidence of tampering, unintentional and intentional vulnerabilities, or evidence of non-compliance with supply chain controls. These include malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, backdoors, and counterfeits. Assessments can include evaluations; design proposal reviews; visual or physical inspection; static and dynamic analyses; visual, x-ray, or magnetic particle inspections; simulations; white, gray, or black box testing; fuzz testing; stress testing; and penetration testing (see SR-6(1) ). Evidence generated during assessments is documented for follow-on actions by organizations. The evidence generated during the organizational or independent assessments of supply chain elements may be used to improve supply chain processes and inform the supply chain risk management process. The evidence can be leveraged in follow-on assessments. Evidence and other documentation may be shared in accordance with organizational agreements.

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Implementation Guidance

Engineering Interpretation

Original engineering commentary written for this explorer — not NIST source text and not authoritative guidance.

No engineering interpretation has been authored for SR-5 yet. This section is architected to receive it — see the Requirements and Assessment sections above for the authoritative NIST source content in the meantime.

Assessment

NIST SP 800-53A REV 5.2.0

Assessment Objectives

  1. acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods to protect against, identify, and mitigate supply chain risks are defined;
  2. <SR-05_ODP strategies, tools, and methods> are employed to protect against supply chain risks;
  3. <SR-05_ODP strategies, tools, and methods> are employed to identify supply chain risks;
  4. <SR-05_ODP strategies, tools, and methods> are employed to mitigate supply chain risks.

Examine

[SELECT FROM: Supply chain risk management policy; supply chain risk management procedures; supply chain risk management plan; system and services acquisition policy; system and services acquisition procedures; procedures addressing supply chain protection; procedures addressing the integration of information security and privacy requirements into the acquisition process; solicitation documentation; acquisition documentation (including purchase orders); service level agreements; acquisition contracts for systems, system components, or services; documentation of training, education, and awareness programs for personnel regarding supply chain risk; system security plan; privacy plan; other relevant documents or records].

Interview

[SELECT FROM: Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities; organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities; organizational personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities].

Test

[SELECT FROM: Organizational processes for defining and employing tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods; mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods].

Overlays

OT/ICS Overlay SP 800-82r3

NIST SP 800-82r3 Appendix F, Table 22. Blank baseline means the control/control enhancement is not selected in that initial OT baseline.

LOW

  • Base control: Included (matches standard baseline)

MODERATE

  • Base control: Included (matches standard baseline)
  • Added: (1)

HIGH

  • Base control: Included (matches standard baseline)
  • Added: (1)

STIGs & CCIs

No STIG checks or CCI mappings are currently loaded for SR-5. This section is architected to display, per product: STIG ID, Finding ID, Severity, Title, Description, Check, Fix, CCI, and NIST control mapping — but nothing is populated here until a real DISA STIG/CCI dataset is ingested.

Learn more about STIG/CCI integration →

Evidence

Potential Evidence — Derived

Categorized from the SP 800-53A "Examine"/"Test" artifact list above by keyword — not an authoritative NIST evidence list.

Policy

  • Supply chain risk management policy
  • supply chain risk management plan
  • system and services acquisition policy
  • system security plan
  • privacy plan

Testing

  • Organizational processes for defining and employing tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods
  • mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods

Other Records

  • supply chain risk management procedures
  • system and services acquisition procedures
  • procedures addressing supply chain protection
  • procedures addressing the integration of information security and privacy requirements into the acquisition process
  • solicitation documentation
  • acquisition documentation (including purchase orders)
  • service level agreements
  • acquisition contracts for systems, system components, or services
  • documentation of training, education, and awareness programs for personnel regarding supply chain risk
  • other relevant documents or records