Application Security and Development STIG

Application management includes the ability to control the number of users and user sessions that utilize an application. Limiting the number of allowed users and sessions per user is helpful in limiting risks related to DoS attacks. This requirement may be met via the application or by utilizing information system session control provided by a web server or other underlying solution that provides specialized session management capabilities. If it has been specified that this requirement will be handled by the application, the capability to limit the maximum number of concurrent single user sessions must be designed and built into the application. This requirement addresses concurrent sessions for individual system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts. The maximum number of concurrent sessions should be defined based upon mission needs and the operational environment for each system.

Persistent cookies are a primary means by which a web application will store application state and user information. Since HTTP is a stateless protocol, this persistence allows the web application developer to provide a robust and customizable user experience. However, if a web application stores user authentication information within a persistent cookie or other temporary storage mechanism, this information can be stolen and used to compromise the users account. Likewise, HTML 5 provides the developer with a client storage capability where application data larger than the 4K cookie size limit can be stored on the local client. While this can be beneficial to the developer, this is considered insecure storage and should not be used for storing sensitive session or security tokens. A cross site scripting attack can put this data at risk. Web applications must clear sensitive data from files and storage areas on the client when the session is terminated.

Leaving a user’s application session established for an indefinite period of time increases the risk of session hijacking. Session termination terminates an individual user's logical application session after 15 minutes of application inactivity at which time the user must re-authenticate and a new session must be established if the user desires to continue work in the application.

Leaving an admin user's application session established for an indefinite period of time increases the risk of session hijacking. Session termination terminates an individual user's logical application session after 10 minutes of application inactivity at which time the user must re-authenticate and a new session must be established if the user desires to continue work in the application.

If a user cannot explicitly end an application session, the session may remain open and be exploited by an attacker. Applications providing user access must provide the ability for users to manually terminate their sessions and log off.

If a user is not explicitly notified that their application session has been terminated, they cannot be certain that their session did not remain open. Applications with a user access interface must provide an explicit logoff message to the user upon successful termination of the user session.

Without the association of security attributes to information, there is no basis for the application to make security-related access control decisions. Security attributes are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity (e.g., subjects and objects) with respect to safeguarding information. These attributes are typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, files) within the information system and are used to enable the implementation of access control and flow control policies; reflect special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions; or support other aspects of the information security policy. One example includes marking data as classified or CUI. These security attributes may be assigned manually or during data processing but either way, it is imperative these assignments are maintained while the data is in storage. If the security attributes are lost when the data is stored, there is the risk of a data compromise. Classify the system hosting the application with default classification. Treat all unmarked data at the highest classification as the overall hosting system is classified. If there is no classification, mark the system high.

Without the association of security attributes to information, there is no basis for the application to make security-related access control decisions. Security attributes are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity (e.g., subjects and objects) with respect to safeguarding information. These attributes are typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, files) within the information system and are used to enable the implementation of access control and flow control policies; reflect special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions; or support other aspects of the information security policy. One example includes marking data as classified or CUI. These security attributes may be assigned manually or during data processing but either way, it is imperative these assignments are maintained while the data is in process. If the security attributes are lost when the data is being processed, there is the risk of a data compromise.

Without the association of security attributes to information, there is no basis for the application to make security-related access control decisions. Security attributes are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of an entity (e.g., subjects and objects) with respect to safeguarding information. These attributes are typically associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, files) within the information system and are used to enable the implementation of access control and flow control policies; reflect special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions; or support other aspects of the information security policy. One example includes marking data as classified or CUI. These security attributes may be assigned manually or during data processing but either way, it is imperative these assignments are maintained while the data is in transmission. If the security attributes are lost when the data is being transmitted, there is the risk of a data compromise.

Without confidentiality protection mechanisms, unauthorized individuals may gain access to sensitive information via a remote access session. Remote access is access to DoD nonpublic information systems by an authorized user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network. Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Encryption provides a means to secure the remote connection to prevent unauthorized access to the data traversing the remote access connection thereby providing a degree of confidentiality. The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security categorization of the information.

Without integrity protection mechanisms, unauthorized individuals may gain access to sensitive information via a remote access session. Remote access is access to DoD nonpublic information systems by an authorized user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network. Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Encryption provides a means to secure the remote connection to prevent unauthorized access to the data traversing the remote access connection. Without integrity protection mechanisms, unauthorized individuals may be able to insert inauthentic content into a remote session. The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security categorization of the information.

Digitally signed SOAP messages provide message integrity and authenticity of the signer of the message independent of the transport layer. Service requests may be intercepted and changed in transit and the data integrity may be at risk if the SOAP message is not digitally signed. Functional architecture aspects of the application security plan identify the application data elements that require data integrity protection.

The lack of time stamps could lead to the eventual replay of the message, leaving the application susceptible to replay events which may result in an immediate loss of confidentiality.

When using WS-Security in SOAP messages, the application should check the validity of the time stamps with creation and expiration times. Time stamps that are not validated may lead to a replay event and provide immediate unauthorized access of the application. Unauthorized access results in an immediate loss of confidentiality.

SAML is a standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains. SAML uses security tokens containing assertions to pass information about a principal (usually an end user) between a SAML authority, (identity provider), and a SAML consumer, (service provider). SAML assertions are usually made about a subject, (user) represented by the <Subject> element. SAML assertion identifiers should be unique across a system implementation. Duplicate SAML assertion identifiers could lead to unauthorized access to a web service.

SAML is a standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains. SAML uses security tokens containing assertions to pass information about a principal (usually an end user) between a SAML authority, (identity provider), and a SAML consumer, (service provider). SAML assertions are usually made about a subject, (user) represented by the <Subject> element. The confidentially of the data in a message as the message is passed through an intermediary web service may be required to be restricted by the intermediary web service. The intermediary web service may leak or distribute the data contained in a message if not encrypted or protected.

SAML is a standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains. SAML uses security tokens containing assertions to pass information about a principal (usually an end user) between a SAML authority, (identity provider), and a SAML consumer, (service provider). SAML assertions are usually made about a subject, (user) represented by the <Subject> element. When a SAML assertion is used with a <SubjectConfirmation> element, a begin and end time for the <SubjectConfirmation> should be set to prevent reuse of the message at a later time. Not setting a specific time period for the <SubjectConfirmation>, may grant immediate access to an attacker and result in an immediate loss of confidentiality.

SAML is a standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains. SAML uses security tokens containing assertions to pass information about a principal (usually an end user) between a SAML authority, (identity provider), and a SAML consumer, (service provider). SAML assertions are usually made about a subject, (user) represented by the <Subject> element. When a SAML assertion is used with a <Conditions> element, a begin and end time for the <Conditions> element should be set in order to specify a timeframe in which the assertion is valid. Not setting a specific time period for the <Conditions> element, the possibility exists of granting immediate access or elevated privileges to an attacker which results in an immediate loss of confidentiality.

Multiple <OneTimeUse> elements used in a SAML assertion can lead to elevation of privileges, if the application does not process SAML assertions correctly.

When the SessionIndex is tied to privacy data (e.g., attributes containing privacy data) the message should be encrypted. If the message is not encrypted there is the possibility of compromise of privacy data.

Enterprise environments make application account management challenging and complex. A manual process for account management functions adds the risk of a potential oversight or other error. Manual examples include but are not limited to admin staff logging into the system or systems and manually performing step by step actions affecting user accounts that could otherwise be automated. This does not include any manual steps taken to initiate automated processes or the use of automated systems. A comprehensive application account management process that includes automation helps to ensure accounts designated as requiring attention are consistently and promptly addressed. Examples include, but are not limited to, using automation to take action on multiple accounts designated as inactive, suspended or terminated or by disabling accounts located in non-centralized account stores such as multiple servers. This requirement applies to all account types, including individual/user, shared, group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and service. The application must be configured to automatically provide account management functions and these functions must immediately enforce the organization's current account policy. The automated mechanisms may reside within the application itself or may be offered by the operating system or other infrastructure providing automated account management capabilities. Automated mechanisms may be comprised of differing technologies that when placed together contain an overall automated mechanism supporting an organization's automated account management requirements. Account management functions include: assignment of group or role membership; identifying account type; specifying user access authorizations (i.e., privileges); account removal, update, or termination; and administrative alerts. The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminated or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using automated telephonic notification to report atypical system account usage.

If shared/group account credentials are not terminated when individuals leave the group, the user that left the group can still gain access even though they are no longer authorized. A shared/group account credential is a shared form of authentication that allows multiple individuals to access the application using a single account. There may also be instances when specific user actions need to be performed on the information system without unique user identification or authentication. Examples of credentials include passwords and group membership certificates.

If temporary user accounts remain active when no longer needed or for an excessive period, these accounts may be used to gain unauthorized access. To mitigate this risk, automated termination of all temporary accounts must be set upon account creation. Temporary accounts are established as part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. If temporary accounts are used, the application must be configured to automatically terminate these types of accounts after a DoD-defined time period of 72 hours starting from the point of account creation. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms meeting or exceeding access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Emergency accounts are administrator accounts which are established in response to crisis situations where the need for rapid account activation is required. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. If these accounts are automatically disabled, system maintenance during emergencies may not be possible, thus adversely affecting system availability. Emergency accounts are different from infrequently used accounts (i.e., local logon accounts used by system administrators when network or normal logon/access is not available). Infrequently used accounts also remain available and are not subject to automatic termination dates. However, an emergency account is normally a different account which is created for use by vendors or system maintainers. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Attackers that are able to exploit an inactive account can potentially obtain and maintain undetected access to an application. Owners of inactive accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. Applications need to track periods of user inactivity and disable accounts after 35 days of inactivity. Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be hijacked, leading to a data compromise. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality. This policy does not apply to either emergency accounts or infrequently used accounts. Infrequently used accounts are local logon administrator accounts used by system administrators when network or normal logon/access is not available. Emergency accounts are administrator accounts created in response to crisis situations.

Test or demonstration accounts are sometimes created during the application installation process. This creates a security risk as these accounts often remain after the initial installation process and can be used to gain unauthorized access to the application. Applications must be designed and configured to disable or delete any unnecessary accounts that may be created. Care must be taken to ensure valid accounts used for valid application operations are not disabled or deleted when this requirement is applied.

Once an attacker establishes initial access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply create a new account. Auditing of account creation is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail documents the creation of application user accounts and, as required, notifies administrators and/or application owners exists. Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms meeting or exceeding access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

One way for an attacker to establish persistent access is for the attacker to modify or copy an existing account. Auditing of account modification is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail documents the modification of application user accounts. Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously modified and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address account requirements and to ensure application accounts follow requirements consistently, application developers are strongly encouraged to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

When application accounts are disabled, user accessibility is affected. Accounts are utilized for identifying individual application users or for identifying the application processes themselves. In order to detect and respond to events affecting user accessibility and application processing, applications must audit account disabling actions and, as required, notify the appropriate individuals, so they can investigate the event. Such a capability greatly reduces the risk that application accessibility will be negatively affected for extended periods of time and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. Application developers are encouraged to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/audit mechanisms such as Syslog, Active Directory or LDAP.

When application accounts are removed, user accessibility is affected. Accounts are utilized for identifying individual application users or for identifying the application processes themselves. In order to detect and respond to events affecting user accessibility and application processing, applications must audit account removal actions and, as required, notify the appropriate individuals, so they can investigate the event. Such a capability greatly reduces the risk that application accessibility will be negatively affected for extended periods of time and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. Application developers are encouraged to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/audit mechanisms such as Syslog, Active Directory or LDAP.

Once an attacker establishes access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply create a new account. Notification of account creation is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the creation of application user accounts and notifies administrators and ISSOs such accounts exist. This type of process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to offload those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Once an attacker establishes access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply create a new account. Notification of account creation is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the modification of application user accounts and notifies administrators and ISSOs such accounts were modified. This type of process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously modified and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to offload those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Once an attacker establishes access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply create a new account. Notification of account creation is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the creation of application user accounts and notifies administrators and ISSOs such accounts exist. This type of process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to offload those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Once an attacker establishes access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to remove an account. Notification of account removal is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the removal of application user accounts and notifies administrators and ISSOs such accounts no longer exist. This type of process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously removed and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to offload those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

When application accounts are enabled, user accessibility is affected. Accounts are utilized for identifying individual application users or for identifying the application processes themselves. In order to detect and respond to events affecting user accessibility and application processing, applications must audit account removal actions and, as required, notify the appropriate individuals, so they can investigate the event. Such a capability greatly reduces the risk that application accessibility will be negatively affected for extended periods of time and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. Application developers are encouraged to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/audit mechanisms such as Syslog, Active Directory or LDAP.

Once an attacker establishes access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of re-establishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to enable an account. Notification of account enabling is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the enabling of application user accounts and notifies administrators and ISSOs such accounts exist. This type of process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously enabled and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. To address access requirements, many application developers choose to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/auditing mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the application developer to offload those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality.

Failure to protect organizational information from data mining may result in a compromise of information. In order to assign the appropriate data protections, application data must be identified and then protection requirements assigned. Access to sensitive data and sensitive data objects should be restricted to those authorized to access the data. Examples of sensitive data include but are not limited to; Social Security Numbers, Personally Identifiable Information, or any other data that is has been identified as being sensitive in nature by the data owner. Data storage objects include, for example, databases, database records, and database fields. Data mining prevention and detection techniques include, for example: limiting the types of responses provided to database queries; limiting the number/frequency of database queries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of such databases; and notifying organizational personnel when atypical database queries or accesses occur. Protection methods include but are not limited to data encryption, Role-Based Access Controls and access authentication.

Failure to protect organizational information from data mining may result in a compromise of information. Data mining occurs when the application is programmatically probed and data is automatically extracted. While there are valid uses for data mining within data sets, the organization should be mindful that adversaries may attempt to use data mining capabilities built into the application in order to completely extract application data so it can be evaluated using methods that are not natively offered by the application. This can provide the adversary with an opportunity to utilize inference attacks or obtain additional insights that might not have been intended when the application was designed. Methods of extraction include database queries or screen scrapes using the application itself. The entity performing the data mining must have access to the application in order to extract the data. Data mining attacks will usually occur with publicly releasable data access but can also occur when access is limited to authorized or authenticated inside users. Data storage objects include, for example, databases, database records, and database fields. Data mining prevention and detection techniques include, for example: limiting the types of responses provided to database queries; limiting the number/frequency of database queries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of such databases; and notifying organizational personnel when atypical database queries or accesses occur.

To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information by entities that have been issued certificates by DoD-approved PKIs, all DoD systems (e.g., networks, web servers, and web portals) must be properly configured to incorporate access control methods that do not rely solely on the possession of a certificate for access. Successful authentication must not automatically give an entity access to a restricted asset or security boundary. Authorization procedures and controls must be implemented to ensure each authenticated entity also has a validated and current authorization. Authorization is the process of determining whether an entity, once authenticated, is permitted to access a specific asset. Information systems use access control policies and enforcement mechanisms to implement this requirement. Access control policies include identity-based policies, role-based policies, and attribute-based policies. Access enforcement mechanisms include access control lists, access control matrices, and cryptography. These policies and mechanisms must be employed by the application to control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users) and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, and domains) in the information system. This requirement is applicable to access control enforcement applications (e.g., authentication servers) and other applications that perform information and system access control functions.

Discretionary Access Control allows users to determine who is allowed to access their data. To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information by entities that have been issued certificates by DoD-approved PKIs, all DoD systems (e.g., networks, web servers, and web portals) must be properly configured to incorporate access control methods that do not rely solely on the possession of a certificate for access. Successful authentication must not automatically give an entity access to an asset or security boundary. Authorization procedures and controls must be implemented to ensure each authenticated entity also has a validated and current authorization. Authorization is the process of determining whether an entity, once authenticated, is permitted to access a specific asset. Information systems use access control policies and enforcement mechanisms to implement this requirement. Access control policies include identity-based policies, role-based policies, and attribute-based policies. Access enforcement mechanisms include access control lists, access control matrices, and cryptography. These policies and mechanisms must be employed by the application to control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users) and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, and domains) in the information system. This requirement is applicable to access control enforcement applications (e.g., authentication servers) and other applications that perform information and system access control functions.

A mechanism to detect and prevent unauthorized communication flow must be configured or provided as part of the system design. If information flow is not enforced based on approved authorizations, the system may become compromised. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within a system and between interconnected systems. The flow of all system information must be monitored and controlled so it does not introduce any unacceptable risk to the systems or data. Application specific examples of enforcement occurs in systems that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services, or message-filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). This is usually established by identifying if there are rulesets, policies or other configurations settings provided by the application which serve to control the flow of information within the system. Control of data flow is established by using labels on data and data subsets, evaluating the destination of the data within or without the system (similar security domain) and referencing a corresponding policy that is used to control the flow of data. Applications providing information flow control must be able to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system in accordance with applicable policy.

A mechanism to detect and prevent unauthorized communication flow must be configured or provided as part of the system design. If information flow is not enforced based on approved authorizations, the system may become compromised. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within a system and between interconnected systems. The flow of all system information must be monitored and controlled so it does not introduce any unacceptable risk to the systems or data. Application specific examples of enforcement occurs in systems that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services, or message-filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). This is usually established by identifying if there are rulesets, policies or other configurations settings provided by the application which serve to control the flow of information within the system. Control of data flow is established by using labels on data and data subsets, evaluating the destination of the data within or without the system (similar security domain) and referencing a corresponding policy that is used to control the flow of data. Applications providing information flow control must be able to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system in accordance with applicable policy.

Preventing non-privileged users from executing privileged functions mitigates the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain unnecessary access to information or privileges. Privileged functions include, for example, establishing accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users.

Applications are often designed to utilize a user account. The account represents a means to control application permissions and access to OS resources, application resources or both. When the application is designed and installed, care must be taken not to assign excessive permissions to the user account that is used by the application. An application operating with unnecessary privileges can potentially give an attacker access to the underlying operating system or if the privileges required for application execution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking such applications/programs, those users are indirectly provided with greater privileges than assigned by organizations. Applications must be designed and configured to operate with only those permissions that are required for proper operation.

Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse, and identify the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat.

By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. User notification when three failed logon attempts are exceeded is an operational consideration determined by the application owner. In some instances the operational situation may dictate that no notice is to be provided to the user when their account is locked. In other situations, the user may be notified their account is now locked. This decision is left to the application owner based upon their operational scenarios.

Once a user account has been locked, it must be unlocked by an administrator. An ISSM and ISSO approved process must be created and followed to ensure the user requesting access is properly authenticated prior to access being re-established. The process must include having the user provide information only the user would know and having the administrator verify the accuracy of the information prior to unlocking the account. This means having the user provide this information when their account is created so the information can be referenced when they are locked out. The process utilized may be manual in nature, however it is recognized that password resets are a time consuming task. To minimize helpdesk resource constraints related to user lockout requests, procedures may be automated by administrators in order to unlock the account or reset the password. Authentication process examples include having the user provide personal information known only by the user and provided when the account was created and/or using Out-of-Band or side channel communication methods such as text messages to the users established cell phone number in order to provide a temporary password or token that can be used to logon once and reset the password. The OWASP site provides an acceptable password reset process that can be used as a reference. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet. Automated procedures should follow industry standards and best practice for securely automating password reset/account unlocks and must be reviewed, tested, and then approved by the ISSM and ISSO.

Display of the DoD-approved use notification before granting access to the application ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. The banner must be formatted in accordance with DTM-08-060. Use the following verbiage for applications that can accommodate banners of 1300 characters: "You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details." Use the following verbiage for operating systems that have severe limitations on the number of characters that can be displayed in the banner: "I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't."

The banner must be acknowledged by the user prior to allowing the user access to the application. This provides assurance that the user has seen the message and accepted the conditions for access. If the consent banner is not acknowledged by the user, DoD will not be in compliance with system use notifications required by law. To establish acceptance of the application usage policy, a click-through banner at application logon is required. The application must prevent further activity until the user executes a positive action to manifest agreement by clicking on a box indicating "OK".

Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the publicly accessible application ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. System use notifications are required only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. The banner must be formatted in accordance with DTM-08-060. Use the following verbiage for desktops, laptops, and other devices accommodating banners of 1300 characters: "You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details." Use the following verbiage for operating systems that have severe limitations on the number of characters that can be displayed in the banner: "I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't."

Providing a last successful logon date and time stamp notification to the user when they authenticate and access the application allows the user to determine if their application account has been used without their knowledge. Armed with that information, the user can notify the application administrator and initiate a forensics investigation to identify root cause. Without providing this information to the user, a potential compromise of user accounts could go unnoticed.

Without non-repudiation, it is impossible to positively attribute an action to an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual). Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information. Non-repudiation protects individuals against later claims by an author of not having authored a particular document, a sender of not having transmitted a message, a receiver of not having received a message, or a signatory of not having signed a document. The application will be configured to provide non-repudiation services for an organization-defined set of commands that are used by the user (or processes action on behalf of the user). DoD PKI provides for non-repudiation through the use of digital signatures. Non-repudiation requirements will vary from one application to another and will be defined based on application functionality, data sensitivity, and mission requirements.

Without the ability to collate records based on the time when the events occurred, the ability to perform forensic analysis and investigations across multiple components is significantly degraded. Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time ordering of the records within organization-defined level of tolerance. This requirement applies to applications which provide the capability to compile system-wide audit records for multiple systems or system components. However, all applications must provide the relevant log details that are used to aggregate the information.

Applications create session IDs at the onset of a user session in order to manage user access to the application and differentiate between different user sessions. It is important to log the creation of these session ID creation events for forensic purposes. It is equally important to not log the session ID itself. Logging the session ID puts active sessions at risk if log data is compromised. Specific session ID information should be removed, masked, sanitized, or encrypted. A hash value of the session ID that can be mapped to the session ID is an acceptable method for assuring active session protection when logging session ID information. Alternatively, logging protections that protect the logs and defend from unauthorized access are means to assure log confidentiality and protect session integrity. Web based applications will often utilize an application server that creates, manages and logs user session IDs. It is acceptable for the application to delegate this requirement to the application server.

Applications should destroy session IDs at the end of a user session in order to terminate user access to the application session and to reduce the possibility of an unauthorized attacker high jacking the session and impersonating the user. It is important to log when session IDs are destroyed for forensic purposes. Web based applications will often utilize an application server that creates, manages and logs session IDs. It is acceptable for the application to delegate this requirement to the application server.

Application design sometimes requires the renewal of session IDs in order to continue approved user access to the application. Session renewal is done on a case by case basis under circumstances defined by the application architecture. The following are some examples of when session renewal must be done; whenever there is a change in user privilege such as transitioning from a user to an admin role or when a user changes from an anonymous user to an authenticated user or when a user's permissions have changed. For these types of critical application functionalities, the previous session ID needs to be destroyed or otherwise invalidated and a new session ID must be created. It is important to log when session IDs are renewed for forensic purposes. Web based applications will often utilize an application server that creates, manages and logs session IDs. It is acceptable for the application to delegate this requirement to the application server.

It is important to identify and exclude certain types of data that is written into the logs. If the logs are compromised and sensitive data is included in the logs, this could assist an attacker in furthering their attack or it could completely compromise the system. Examples of such data include but are not limited to; Passwords, Session IDs, Application source code, encryption keys, and sensitive data such as personal health information (PHI), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), or government identifiers (e.g., SSN).

When a user's session times out, it is important to be able to identify these events in the application logs. Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the application (e.g., process, module). Certain specific application functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records. DoD has defined the list of events for which the application will provide an audit record generation capability as the following: (i) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels); (ii) Access actions, such as successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities or other system level access, starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations, successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects, all program initiations, and all direct access to the information system; and (iii) All account creation, modification, disabling, and termination actions. Web-based applications will often utilize an application server that creates, manages, and logs session timeout information. It is acceptable for the application to delegate this requirement to the application server.

It is important to include the time stamps for when an event occurred. Failure to include time stamps in the event logs is detrimental to forensic analysis.

HTTP header information is a critical component of data that is used when evaluating forensic activity. Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the application (e.g., process, module). Certain specific application functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records. DoD has defined the list of events for which the application will provide an audit record generation capability as the following: (i) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels); (ii) Access actions, such as successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities or other system level access, starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations, successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects, all program initiations, and all direct access to the information system; and (iii) All account creation, modification, disabling, and termination actions.

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the application (e.g., process, module). Certain specific application functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records. The IP addresses of remote systems that connect to the application are an important aspect of identifying the sources of application activity. Recording these IP addresses in the application logs provides forensic evidence and aids in investigating and identifying sources of malicious behavior related to security events.

When users conduct activity within an application, that user’s identity must be recorded in the audit log. Failing to record the identity of the user responsible for the activity within the application is detrimental to forensic analysis.

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). When a user is granted access or rights to application features and function not afforded to an ordinary user, they have been granted access to privilege and that action must be logged.

Security objects represent application objects that provide or require security protections or have a security role within the application. Examples include but are not limited to, files, application modules, folders, and database records. Essentially, if permissions are assigned to protect it, it can be considered a security object. Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

A security level denotes a permissions or authorization capability within the application. This is most often associated with a user role. Attempts to access a security level can occur when a user attempts an action such as escalating their privilege from within the application itself. Attempts to access a security level can be construed as an attempt to change your user role from within the application. Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Categories of information is information that is identified as being sensitive or requiring additional protection from regular user access. The data is accessed on a need to know basis and has been assigned a category or a classification in order to assign protections and track access. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

A security level denotes a permissions or authorization capability within the application. This is most often associated with a user role. Attempts to modify a security level can be construed as an attempt to change the configuration of the application so as to create a new security role or modify an existing security role. Some applications may or may not provide this capability. Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

A security level denotes a permissions or authorization capability within the application. This is most often associated with a user role. Attempts to delete a security level can be construed as an attempt to change the configuration of the application so as to delete an existing security role. Some applications may or may not provide this capability. Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter). Knowing when a user successfully or unsuccessfully logged on to the application is critical information that aids in forensic analysis.

Privileged activities include the tasks or actions taken by users in an administrative role (admin, backup operator, manager, etc.) which are used to manage or reconfigure application function. Examples include but are not limited to: Modifying application logging verbosity, starting or stopping of application services, application user account management, managing application functionality, or otherwise changing the underlying application capabilities such as adding a new application module or plugin. Privileged access does not include an application design which does not modify the application but does provide users with the functionality or the ability to manage their own user specific preferences or otherwise tailor the application to suit individual user needs based upon choices or selections built into the application.

Knowing when a user’s application session began and when it ended is critical information that aids in forensic analysis.

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Application objects are system or application components that comprise the application. This includes but is not limited to; application files, folders, processes and modules. This requirement is not intended to force the use of debug logging which would be used for troubleshooting or forensic actions; rather it is intended to assure the application strikes a balance when auditing access to application objects and logs normal and potentially abnormal application activity. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

Without generating audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. When an application provides direct access to underlying OS features and functions, that access must be audited. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system (e.g., module or policy filter).

When application user accounts are created, modified, disabled or terminated the event must be logged. Centralized management of user accounts allows for rapid response to user related security events and also provides ease of management. Allowing the centralized user management solution to log these events is acceptable practice; however, if the application provides a user management interface to manage these tasks, the application must also log these events. Application developers are encouraged to integrate their applications with enterprise-level authentication/access/audit mechanisms such as Syslog, Active Directory or LDAP.

If the application does not begin logging upon startup, important log events could be missed.

Forensics is a large part of security incident response. Applications must provide a record of their actions so application events can be investigated post-event. Attackers may attempt to shut off the application logging capability to cover their activity while on the system. Recording the shutdown event and the time it occurred in the application or system logs helps to provide forensic evidence that aids in investigating the events.

The IP addresses of the systems that the application connects to are an important aspect of identifying application network related activity. Recording the IP addresses of the system the application connects to in the application logs provides forensic evidence and aids in investigating and correlating the sources of malicious behavior related to security events. Logging this information can be particularly useful for Service-Oriented Applications where there is application to application connectivity.

When users access application data, there is risk of data compromise or seepage if the account used to access is compromised or access is granted improperly. To be able to investigate which account accessed data, the account access must be logged. Without establishing when the access event occurred, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Associating event types with detected events in the application and audit logs provides a means of investigating an attack; recognizing resource utilization or capacity thresholds; or identifying an improperly configured application.

When users change/modify application data, there is risk of data compromise if the account used to access is compromised or access is granted improperly. To be able to investigate which account accessed data, the account making the data changes must be logged. Without establishing when the data change event occurred, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. Associating event types with detected events in the application and audit logs provides a means of investigating an attack; recognizing resource utilization or capacity thresholds; or identifying an improperly configured application.

Without establishing when events occurred, it is impossible to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, and provide forensic analysis, it is essential for security personnel to know when events occurred (date and time).

It is impossible to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident if the details regarding the source of the event it not available. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, and provide forensic analysis, it is essential for security personnel to know where within the application the events occurred, such as which application component, application modules, filenames, and functionality. Associating information about where the event occurred within the application provides a means of quickly investigating an attack; recognizing resource utilization or capacity thresholds; or identifying an improperly configured application.

Without establishing the source, it is impossible to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack. In the case of centralized logging, or other instances where log files are consolidated, there is risk that the application's log data could be co-mingled with other log data. To address this issue, the application itself must be identified as well as the application host or client name. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, and provide forensic analysis, it is essential for security personnel to know the source of the event, particularly in the case of centralized logging. Associating information about the source of the event within the application provides a means of investigating an attack; recognizing resource utilization or capacity thresholds; or identifying an improperly configured application.

Without information about the outcome of events, security personnel cannot make an accurate assessment as to whether an attack was successful or if changes were made to the security state of the system. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). As such, they also provide a means to measure the impact of an event and help authorized personnel to determine the appropriate response. Successful application events are expected to far outnumber errors. Therefore, success events may be implied by default and not specified in the logs if this behavior is documented.

Without information that establishes the identity of the subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) associated with the events, security personnel cannot determine responsibility for the potentially harmful event. Event identifiers (if authenticated or otherwise known) include, but are not limited to, user database tables, primary key values, user names, or process identifiers.

Reconstruction of harmful events or forensic analysis is not possible if audit records do not contain enough information. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. The additional information required is dependent on the type of information (i.e., sensitivity of the data and the environment within which it resides). At a minimum, the organization must audit either full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group users, or both. The organization must maintain audit trails in sufficient detail to reconstruct events to determine the cause and impact of compromise. In addition, the application must have the capability to include organization-defined additional, more detailed information in the audit records for audit events.

Without required logging and access control, security issues related to data changes will not be identified. This could lead to security compromises such as data misuse, unauthorized changes, or unauthorized access. Transaction logs contain a sequential record of all changes to the database. Using a transaction log helps with maintaining application availability and aids in speedy recovery. Transactional logging should be enabled whenever the application database offers the transactional logging capability.

Without the ability to centrally manage the content captured in the audit records, identification, troubleshooting, and correlation of suspicious behavior would be difficult and could lead to a delayed or incomplete analysis of an ongoing attack. This requirement requires that the content captured in audit records be managed from a central location (necessitating automation). Centralized management of audit records and logs provides for efficiency in maintenance and management of records, as well as the backup and archiving of those records. Application components requiring centralized audit log management must have the capability to support centralized management. This requirement applies to centralized management applications or similar types of applications designed to manage and configure audit record capture.

Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. In addition, attackers often manipulate logs to hide or obfuscate their activity. The goal is to off-load application logs to a separate server as quickly and efficiently as possible so as to mitigate these risks. A centralized logging solution offering applications an enterprise designed and managed logging capability which is the desired solution. However, when a centralized logging solution is not an option due to the operational environment or other situations where the risk has been officially recognized and accepted, off-loading is a common process utilized to address this type of scenario.

Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. In addition, attackers often manipulate logs to hide or obfuscate their activity. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity or when trying to assure log availability and integrity. This requirement is meant to address space limitations and integrity issues that can be encountered when storing logs on the local server. The goal of the requirement being to offload application logs to a separate server as quickly and efficiently as possible so as to mitigate these risks.

If security personnel are not notified immediately upon storage volume utilization reaching 75%, they are unable to plan for storage capacity expansion. Due to variances in application usage and audit records storage usage, the SA and the ISSO may evaluate usage patterns and determine if a higher percentage of usage is warranted before an alarm is sent. The intent of the requirement is to provide a warning that will allow the SA and ISSO ample time to plan and implement an audit storage capacity expansion that will provide for the increased audit log storage requirements without forcing an emergency or otherwise negatively impacting the recording of audit events. The requirement will take into account a reasonable amount of processing time such as 1 or 2 minutes that may be required of the system in order to satisfy the requirement.

Applications that are categorized as having a high or moderate impact on the organization must provide immediate alerts when encountering failures with the application audit system. It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected. Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. While alerts provide organizations with urgent messages containing important information regarding application audit log activity, real-time alerts provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or no more than 1-2 minutes). Without a real-time alert, security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected.

It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected. Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. This requirement applies to each audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are stored), the centralized audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories combined), or both.

It is critical that when the application is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required, it take action to mitigate the failure. Audit processing failures include: software/hardware errors; failures in the audit capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Responses to audit failure depend upon the nature of the failure mode. When availability is an overriding concern, other approved actions in response to an audit failure are as follows: (i) If the failure was caused by the lack of audit record storage capacity, the application must continue generating audit records if possible (automatically restarting the audit service if necessary), overwriting the oldest audit records in a first-in-first-out manner. (ii) If audit records are sent to a centralized collection server and communication with this server is lost or the server fails, the application must queue audit records locally until communication is restored or until the audit records are retrieved manually. Upon restoration of the connection to the centralized collection server, action should be taken to synchronize the local audit data with the collection server.

Successful incident response and auditing relies on timely, accurate system information and analysis in order to allow the organization to identify and respond to potential incidents in a proficient manner. If the application does not provide the ability to centrally review the application logs, forensic analysis is negatively impacted. Segregation of logging data to multiple disparate computer systems is counterproductive and makes log analysis and log event alarming difficult to implement and manage, particularly when the system or application has multiple logging components written to different locations or systems. Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include, for example, Security Information Management products.

The ability to specify the event criteria that are of interest provides the persons reviewing the logs with the ability to quickly isolate and identify these events without having to review entries that are of little or no consequence to the investigation. Without this capability, forensic investigations are impeded. Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component. This requires applications to provide the capability to customize audit record reports based on organization-defined criteria.

The ability to generate on-demand reports, including after the audit data has been subjected to audit reduction, greatly facilitates the organization's ability to generate incident reports as needed to better handle larger-scale or more complex security incidents. Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. The report generation capability provided by the application must support on-demand (i.e., customizable, ad-hoc, and as-needed) reports. This requirement is specific to applications with audit reduction capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand audit review and analysis.

The ability to perform on-demand audit review and analysis, including after the audit data has been subjected to audit reduction, greatly facilitates the organization's ability to generate incident reports as needed to better handle larger-scale or more complex security incidents. Audit reduction is a technique used to reduce the volume of audit records in order to facilitate a manual review. Audit reduction does not alter original audit records. The report generation capability provided by the application must support on-demand (i.e., customizable, ad-hoc, and as-needed) reports. This requirement is specific to applications with audit reduction capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand audit review and analysis.

If the audit reduction capability does not support after-the-fact investigations, it is difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack, or identify those responses for one. This capability is also required to comply with applicable Federal laws and DoD policies. Audit reduction capability must support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents either natively or through the use of third-party tools. This requirement is specific to applications with audit reduction capabilities.

The report generation capability must support on-demand review and analysis in order to facilitate the organization's ability to generate incident reports as needed to better handle larger-scale or more complex security incidents. Report generation must be capable of generating on-demand (i.e., customizable, ad-hoc, and as-needed) reports. On-demand reporting allows personnel to report issues more rapidly to more effectively meet reporting requirements. Collecting log data and aggregating it to present the data in a single, consolidated report achieves this objective. Audit reduction and report generation capabilities do not always reside on the same information system or within the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. The audit reduction capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the information system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be a significant issue if the granularity of the time stamp in the record is insufficient. This requirement is specific to applications with report generation capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand audit review and analysis.

The report generation capability must support on-demand reporting in order to facilitate the organization's ability to generate incident reports as needed to better handle larger-scale or more complex security incidents. The report generation capability provided by the application must be capable of generating on-demand (i.e., customizable, ad-hoc, and as-needed) reports. On-demand reporting allows personnel to report issues more rapidly to more effectively meet reporting requirements. Collecting log data and aggregating it to present the data in a single, consolidated report achieves this objective. This requirement is specific to applications with report generation capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand reporting requirements.

If the report generation capability does not support after-the-fact investigations, it is difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack, or identify those responses for one. This capability is also required to comply with applicable Federal laws and DoD policies. The report generation capability must support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents either natively or through the use of third-party tools. This requirement is specific to applications with report generation capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand reporting requirements.

If the audit reduction capability alters the content or time ordering of audit records, the integrity of the audit records is compromised, and the records are no longer usable for forensic analysis. Time ordering refers to the chronological organization of records based on time stamps. The degree of time stamp precision can affect this. Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. This requirement is specific to applications with audit reduction capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand audit review and analysis.

If the audit report generation capability alters the original content or time ordering of audit records, the integrity of the audit records is compromised, and the records are no longer usable for forensic analysis. Time ordering refers to the chronological organization of records based on time stamps. The degree of time stamp precision can affect this. The report generation capability provided by the application can generate customizable reports. This requirement is specific to applications with audit reduction capabilities; however, applications need to support on-demand audit review and analysis.

Without an internal clock used as the reference for the time stored on each event to provide a trusted common reference for the time, forensic analysis would be impeded. Determining the correct time a particular event occurred on a system is critical when conducting forensic analysis and investigating system events. If the internal clock is not used, the system may not be able to provide time stamps for log messages. Additionally, externally generated time stamps may not be accurate. Applications can use the capability of an operating system or purpose-built module for this purpose.

If time stamps are not consistently applied and there is no common time reference, it is difficult to perform forensic analysis. Time stamps generated by the application include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC.

Without sufficient granularity of time stamps, it is not possible to adequately determine the chronological order of records. Time stamps generated by the application include date and time. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and reference clocks.

If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is difficult if not impossible to achieve. In addition, access to audit records provides information an attacker could potentially use to his or her advantage. To ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from any and all unauthorized access. This includes read, write, and copy access. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design. Commonly employed methods for protecting audit information include least privilege permissions as well as restricting the location and number of log file repositories. Additionally, applications with user interfaces to audit records should not allow for the unfettered manipulation of or access to those records via the application. If the application provides access to the audit data, the application becomes accountable for ensuring audit information is protected from unauthorized access. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity.

If audit data were to become compromised, then forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. To ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized modification. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods, which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include ensuring log files receive the proper file system permissions, and limiting log data locations. Applications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights that the user enjoys in order to make access decisions regarding the modification of audit data. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity.

If audit data were to become compromised, then forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. To ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized deletion. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods, which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include: ensuring log files receive the proper file system permissions utilizing file system protections, restricting access, and backing up log data to ensure log data is retained. Applications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the deletion of audit data. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Audit information may include data from other applications or be included with the audit application itself.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit data. Applications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit data. Applications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the modification of audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Therefore, protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized operation on audit data. Applications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the deletion of audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.

Protection of log data includes assuring log data is not accidentally lost or deleted. Backing up audit records to a different system or onto separate media than the system being audited on an organizationally defined frequency helps to assure in the event of a catastrophic system failure, the audit records will be retained. This helps to ensure a compromise of the information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. This requirement only applies to applications that have a native backup capability for audit records. Operating system backup requirements cover applications that do not provide native backup functions.

Audit records may be tampered with; if the integrity of audit data were to become compromised, then forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. Protection of audit records and audit data is of critical importance. Cryptographic mechanisms are the industry established standard used to protect the integrity of audit data. An example of a cryptographic mechanism is the computation and application of a cryptographic-signed hash using asymmetric cryptography. This requirement applies to applications that generate, process or manage audit records and is applied once audit processing has completed and the audit record is being stored.

Protecting the integrity of the tools used for auditing purposes is a critical step to ensuring the integrity of audit data. Audit data includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. It is not uncommon for attackers to replace the audit tools or inject code into the existing tools with the purpose of providing the capability to hide or erase system activity from the audit logs. To address this risk, audit tools must be cryptographically signed/hashed and the resulting value securely stored in order to provide the capability to identify when the audit tools have been modified, manipulated or replaced. Some OSs provide a native command line tool capable of extracting or creating a hash value. Care must be taken to ensure any hashing algorithm strength used is acceptable. An example is UNIX OS variants that provide the "shasum" utility with SHA256 capabilities. Windows is not known to provide a native cryptographic tool that utilizes an acceptable hashing algorithm. The Windows fciv.exe checksum tool currently only utilizes MD5 and SHA1 which are not acceptable hashing algorithms.

Protecting the integrity of the tools used for auditing purposes is a critical step to ensuring the integrity of audit data. Audit data includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor provided and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators. It is not uncommon for attackers to replace the audit tools or inject code into the existing tools with the purpose of providing the capability to hide or erase system activity from the audit logs. To address this risk, audit tools must be cryptographically signed/hashed in order to provide the capability to identify when the audit tools have been modified, manipulated or replaced. An example is a checksum hash of the file or files.

Allowing regular users to install software without explicit privileges creates the risk that untested or potentially malicious software will be installed on the system. Explicit privileges (escalated or administrative privileges) provide the regular user with explicit capabilities and control that exceeds the rights of a regular user. Application functionality will vary, and while users are not permitted to install unapproved applications, there may be instances where the organization allows the user to install approved software packages such as from an approved software repository. The application must enforce software installation by users based upon what types of software installations are permitted (e.g., updates and security patches to existing software) and what types of installations are prohibited (e.g., software whose pedigree with regard to being potentially malicious is unknown or suspect) by the organization. For example, this requirement applies to applications that provide the ability to extend application functionality (e.g., plug-ins, add-ons) and software management applications.

Failure to provide logical access restrictions associated with changes to application configuration may have significant effects on the overall security of the system. When dealing with access restrictions pertaining to change control, it should be noted that any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. Accordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals should be allowed to obtain access to application components for the purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Logical access restrictions include, for example, controls that restrict access to workflow automation, media libraries, abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times, making unauthorized changes easy to discover).

Without auditing the enforcement of access restrictions against changes to the application configuration, it will be difficult to identify attempted attacks and an audit trail will not be available for forensic investigation for after-the-fact actions. Enforcement actions are the methods or mechanisms used to prevent unauthorized changes to configuration settings. Enforcement action methods may be as simple as denying access to a file based on the application of file permissions (access restriction). Audit items may consist of lists of actions blocked by access restrictions or changes identified after the fact. If application configuration is maintained by using a text editor to modify a configuration file, this function may be delegated to an operating system file monitoring/auditing capability.

Changes to any software components can have significant effects on the overall security of the application. Verifying software components have been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Accordingly, patches, service packs, or application components must be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization. Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed certificates are disallowed by this requirement. The application should not have to verify the software again. This requirement does not mandate DOD certificates for this purpose; however, the certificate used to verify the software must be from an approved certificate authority (CA). If this capability is not present, the vendor must provide a cryptographic hash value that can be verified by a system administrator prior to installation.

If the application were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. This requirement applies to applications with software libraries that are accessible and configurable, as in the case of interpreted languages. Software libraries also include privileged programs which execute with escalated privileges. Only qualified and authorized individuals will be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications.

An application vulnerability assessment is a test conducted in order to identify weaknesses and security vulnerabilities that may exist within an application. The testing must cover all aspects and components of the application architecture. If an application consists of a web server and a database, then both components must be tested for vulnerabilities to the fullest extent possible. Vulnerability assessment tests normally utilize a combination of specialized software called application vulnerability scanners as well as custom scripts and manual tests. In some instances, multiple tools are required in order to test all aspects of application features, functions and architecture. The vulnerability scanner is typically configured to communicate with the application through the user interface or via an applications communication port. In addition to using automated tools, manual tests conducted from the OS console such as executing custom scripts or reviewing configuration settings for known vulnerabilities may also be included as part of the test. Testers will typically utilize application user test accounts in order to test application features and functionality such as adding content, executing queries and completing transactions. The vulnerability testing software utilizes user actions and access as well as a list of known security vulnerabilities in order to detect and identify weak security controls or misconfigurations that could potentially be manipulated by the user or create a security vulnerability. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) top 10 for 2013 includes the following top issues that should be tested. The site is available by pointing your browser to https://www.owasp.org. A1 Injection A2 Weak authentication and session management A3 XSS A4 Insecure Direct Object References A5 Security Misconfiguration A6 Sensitive Data Exposure A7 Missing Function Level Access Control A8 Cross Site Request Forgery A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards The OWASP top 10 are categories of tests that can be applied to most but not necessarily all applications and are provided as an example of what to test for. Scanning tools include a multitude of tests that fall under these categories but may refer to these tests by a different name. Testing must be conducted on a periodic basis while the application is in production and subsequent to system changes to ensure any changes made to the system do not introduce new security vulnerabilities.

Control of application execution is a mechanism used to prevent execution of unauthorized applications in order to follow the rules of least privilege. Some applications may provide a capability that runs counter to the mission or provides users with functionality that exceeds mission requirements. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Removal of executable programs is not always possible; therefore, establishing a method of preventing program execution is critical to maintaining a secure system baseline. Software program restrictions include restricting execution of programs in certain environments, while preventing execution in other environments; or limiting execution of certain application functionality based on organization-defined criteria (e.g., privileges, subnets, sandboxed environments, security managers, roles).

Utilizing a whitelist provides a configuration management method for allowing the execution of only authorized software. Using only authorized software decreases risk by limiting the number of potential vulnerabilities. The organization must identify authorized software programs and permit execution of authorized software. The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. Verification of whitelisted software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup. This requirement applies to configuration management applications or similar types of applications designed to manage system processes and configurations (e.g., HBSS and software wrappers).

It is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. These unnecessary capabilities or services are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecured. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors. Applications are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Examples of non-essential capabilities include, but are not limited to, advertising software or browser plug-ins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality not required for every mission, but cannot be disabled.

In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. Applications are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., email and web services; however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the application must support the organizational requirements providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues.

Without reauthentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization. When applications provide the capability to change security roles or escalate the functional capability of the application, it is critical the user reauthenticate. In addition to the reauthentication requirements associated with session locks, organizations may require reauthentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations, including (but not limited to) the following circumstances: (i) When authenticators change; (ii) When roles change; (iii) When security categories of information systems change; (iv) When the execution of privileged functions occurs; (v) After a fixed period of time; or (vi) Periodically. Within the DOD, the minimum circumstances requiring reauthentication are privilege escalation and role changes.

Without reauthenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced; thereby facilitating malicious activity. In addition to the reauthentication requirements associated with session locks, organizations may require reauthentication of devices, including (but not limited to), the following other situations: (i) When authenticators change; (ii) When roles change; (iii) When security categories of information systems change; (iv) After a fixed period of time; or (v) Periodically. For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of identification claims may be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to provide the identification decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers) to the services that need to act on those decisions. Gateways and SOA applications are examples of where this requirement would apply.

To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, organizational users must be identified and authenticated to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. Organizational users include organizational employees or individuals the organization deems to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors). Organizational users (and any processes acting on behalf of users) must be uniquely identified and authenticated for all accesses, except the following: (i) Accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization. Organizations document specific user actions that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication; and (ii) Accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts (e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity.

Multifactor authentication requires using two or more factors to achieve authentication and access. Factors include: (i) something a user knows (e.g., password/PIN); (ii) something a user has (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something a user is (e.g., biometric). Multifactor authentication decreases the attack surface by virtue of the fact that attackers must obtain two factors, a physical token or a biometric and a PIN, in order to authenticate. It is not enough to simply steal a user's password to obtain access. A privileged account is defined as an information system account with authorizations of a privileged user. An Alt. Token is a separate CAC like token used specifically for administrative account access and serves as a separate identifier much like a separate user account. Network access is defined as access to an information system by a user (or a process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a network (e.g., local area network, wide area network, or the Internet).

The use of PIV credentials facilitates standardization and reduces the risk of unauthorized access. DoD has mandated the use of the CAC to support identity management and personal authentication for systems covered under HSPD 12, as well as a primary component of layered protection for national security systems.

The use of PIV credentials facilitates standardization and reduces the risk of unauthorized access. DoD has mandated the use of the CAC to support identity management and personal authentication for systems covered under HSPD 12, as well as a primary component of layered protection for national security systems. If the application does not verify the credentials provided, user authentication cannot be established which places the integrity and confidentiality of the application at risk.

To assure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, non-privileged users must utilize multifactor authentication to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. Multifactor authentication uses two or more factors to achieve authentication. Factors include: (i) Something you know (e.g., password/PIN); (ii) Something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, CAC/SIPRNet token); or (iii) Something you are (e.g., biometric). A non-privileged account is any information system account with authorizations of a non-privileged user. Network access is any access to an application by a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) where said access is obtained through a network connection. Applications integrating with the DoD Active Directory and utilize the DoD CAC are an example of compliant multifactor authentication solutions.

Multifactor authentication (MFA) requires using two or more factors to achieve authentication and access. Factors include: (i) something a user knows (e.g., password/PIN); (ii) something a user has (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something a user is (e.g., biometric). MFA decreases the attack surface by virtue of the fact that attackers must obtain two factors, a physical token or a biometric and a PIN, in order to authenticate. It is not enough to simply steal a user's password to obtain access. A privileged account is defined as an information system account with authorizations of a privileged user. An Alt. Token is a separate CAC or token used specifically for administrative account access and serves as a separate identifier much like a separate user account. Local access is defined as access to an organizational information system by a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a direct connection without the use of a network.

To assure accountability, prevent unauthenticated access, and prevent misuse of the system, privileged users must utilize multifactor authentication (MFA) for local access. MFA is defined as using two or more factors to achieve authentication. Factors include: (i) Something a user knows (e.g., password/PIN); (ii) Something a user has (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) Something a user is (e.g., biometric). A nonprivileged account is defined as an information system account with authorizations of a regular or nonprivileged user. Local access is defined as access to an organizational information system by a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a direct connection without the use of a network. Applications integrating with the DOD Active Directory and utilize the DOD CAC are examples of compliant multifactor authentication solutions.

To ensure individual accountability and prevent unauthorized access, application users must be individually identified and authenticated. Individual accountability mandates that each user is uniquely identified. A group authenticator is a shared account or some other form of authentication that allows multiple unique individuals to access the application using a single account. If an application allows or provides for group authenticators, it must first individually authenticate users prior to implementing group authenticator functionality. Some applications may not have the need to provide a group authenticator; this is considered a matter of application design. In those instances where the application design includes the use of a group authenticator, this requirement will apply. There may also be instances when specific user actions need to be performed on the information system without unique user identification or authentication. An example of this type of access is a web server which contains publicly releasable information.

A replay attack may enable an unauthorized user to gain access to the application. Authentication sessions between the authenticator and the application validating the user credentials must not be vulnerable to a replay attack. An authentication process resists replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve a successful authentication by recording and replaying a previous authentication message. A privileged account is any information system account with authorizations of a privileged user. Techniques used to address this include protocols using nonces (e.g., numbers generated for a specific one time use) or challenges (e.g., TLS, WS_Security). Additional techniques include time-synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.

A replay attack is a man-in-the-middle style attack which allows an attacker to repeat or alter a valid data transmission that may enable unauthorized access to the application. Authentication sessions between the authenticating client and the application server validating the user credentials must not be vulnerable to a replay attack. The protection methods selected to protect against a replay attack will vary according to the application architecture. An authentication process resists replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve a successful authentication by recording and replaying a previous authentication message. A nonprivileged account is any operating system account with authorizations of a nonprivileged user. Techniques used to address this include protocols using nonces (e.g., numbers generated for a specific one time use), challenges (e.g., TLS, WS_Security), and PKI certificates. Additional techniques include time-synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.

Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. With one way SSL authentication which is the typical form of SSL authentication done between a web browser client and a web server, the client requests the server certificate to validate the server's identity and establish a secure connection. When SSL mutual authentication is used, the server is configured to request the client’s certificate as well so the server can also identify the client. For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of identification claims may be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to provide the identification decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers) to the services that need to act on those decisions. This requirement applies to applications that connect either locally, remotely, or through a network to an endpoint device (including but not limited to: workstations, printers, servers (outside a datacenter), VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs). Gateways and SOA applications are examples of where this requirement would apply.

Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of authentication claims may be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to provide authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions. This requirement applies to applications that connect either locally, remotely, or through a network to an endpoint device (including but not limited to: workstations, printers, servers (outside a datacenter), VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs). Gateways and SOA applications are examples of where this requirement would apply. End point devices are not: Client desktop workstations only offer browser-based web application access where the user authenticates at the app layer. Device authentication is a solution enabling an organization to manage devices. It is an additional layer of authentication ensuring only specific pre-authorized devices can access the system.

Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. One way SSL/TLS authentication is the typical form of authentication done between a web browser client and a web server. The client requests the server certificate to validate the server's identity and establish a secure connection. When SSL/TLS mutual authentication is used, the server is configured to request the client’s certificate as well so the server can also identify the client. This form of authentication is normally chosen for system to system communications that leverage HTTP as the transport. It should be noted that SSL is being deprecated and replaced with TLS. For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of identification claims may be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to provide the identification decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers) to the services that need to act on those decisions. This requirement applies to applications that connect either locally, remotely, or through a network to an endpoint device (including but not limited to: workstations, printers, servers (outside a datacenter), VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs). Gateways and SOA applications are examples of where this requirement would apply.

Device identifiers are used to identify hardware devices that interact with the application much like a user account is used to identify an application user. Examples of hardware devices include but are not limited to mobile phones, application gateways, or other types of smart hardware. This requirement does not apply to individual application user accounts. This requirement is not applicable to shared information system accounts, application groups, or roles (e.g., guest and anonymous accounts) that are used by the application itself in order to function. Care must be taken to not disable identifiers that are used by the application in order to function. Inactive device identifiers pose a risk to systems and applications. Attackers that are able to exploit an inactive identifier can potentially obtain and maintain undetected access to the application. Applications need to track periods of device inactivity and disable the device identifier after 35 days of inactivity. This is usually accomplished by disabling the account used by the device to access the application. Applications that use cryptographic certificates for device authentication may use the expiration date assigned to the certificate to meet this requirement with the understanding that the certificate is created and managed in accordance with DOD PKI policy and can be revoked by a trusted certificate authority (CA). To avoid having to build complex device management capabilities directly into their application, developers should leverage the underlying OS or other account management infrastructure (AD, LDAP) that is already in place within the organization and meets organizational user account management requirements. Applications are encouraged to utilize a centralized data store such as Active Directory or LDAP to offload device management requirements and ensure compliance with policy requirements.

The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength and how long it takes to crack a password. The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of more characters in a password helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to compromise the password.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Passwords need to be protected at all times and using a strong one-way hashing encryption algorithm with a salt is the standard method for providing a means to validate a user's password without having to store the actual password. Performance and time required to access are factors that must be considered and the one way hash is the most feasible means of securing the password and providing an acceptable measure of password security. If passwords are stored in clear text, they can be plainly read and easily compromised. In many instances, verifying the user knows a password is performed using a password verifier. In its simplest form, a password verifier is a computational function that is capable of creating a hash of a password and determining if the value provided by the user matches the hash. A more secure version of verifying a user knowing a password is to store the result of an iterating hash function and a large random SALT value as follows: H0 = H(pwd, H(salt)) Hn = H(Hn-1,H(salt)) Where n is a cryptographically-strong random [*3] number. Hn is stored, along with the salt. When the application wishes to verify that the user knows a password, it simply repeats the process and compares Hn with the stored Hn. A SALT is essentially a fixed-length cryptographically-strong random value. Another method used is utilizing a keyed hash message authentication code (HMAC). HMAC calculates a message authentication code via a cryptographic hash function used in conjunction with an encryption key. The key must be protected as with any private key. Applications must only store passwords that have been cryptographically protected.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DoD employee, member of the military, or a DoD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. and - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Passwords need to be protected at all times and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Applications can accomplish this by making direct function calls to encryption modules or by leveraging operating system encryption capabilities.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps prevent repeated password changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. Restricting this setting limits the user's ability to change their password. Passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals; however, if the application allows the user to immediately and continually change their password, then the password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords need to be changed at specific intervals. One method of minimizing this risk is to use complex passwords and periodically change them. If the application does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the system and/or application passwords could be compromised. This requirement does not include emergency administration accounts which are meant for access to the application in case of failure. These accounts are not required to have maximum password lifetime restrictions.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. To meet password policy requirements, passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals. If the information system or application allows the user to consecutively reuse their password when that password has exceeded its defined lifetime, the end result is a password that is not changed as per policy requirements.

Use of passwords for application authentication is intended only for limited situations and should not be used as a replacement for two-factor CAC-enabled authentication. Examples of situations where a user ID and password might be used include but are not limited to: - When the application user base does not have a CAC and is not a current DOD employee, member of the military, or a DOD contractor. - When an application user has been officially designated as a Temporary Exception User; one who is temporarily unable to present a CAC for some reason (lost, damaged, not yet issued, broken card reader) and to satisfy urgent organizational needs must be temporarily permitted to use user ID/password authentication until the problem with CAC use has been remedied. - When the application is publicly available and or hosting publicly releasable data requiring some degree of need-to-know protection. Without providing this capability, an account may be created without a password. Nonrepudiation cannot be guaranteed once an account is created if a user is not forced to change the temporary password upon initial logon. Temporary passwords are typically used to allow access to applications when new accounts are created or passwords are changed. It is common practice for administrators to create temporary passwords for user accounts which allow the users to log on, yet force them to change the password once they have successfully authenticated.

If the application allows user A to change user B's password, user B can be locked out of the application, and user A is provided the ability to grant themselves access to the application as user B. This violates application integrity and availability principles. Many applications provide a password reset capability that allows the user to reset their password if they forget it. Protections must be utilized when establishing a password change or reset capability to prevent user A from changing user B's password. Protection is usually accomplished by having each user provide an out of bounds (OOB) communication address such as a separate email address or SMS/text address (mobile phone) that can be used to transmit password reset/change information. This OOB information is usually provided by the user when the user account is created. The OOB information is validated as part of the user account creation process by sending an account validation request to the OOB address and having the user respond to the request. Applications must prevent users other than the administrator or the user associated with the account from changing the account password.

The application must ensure that a user does not retain any rights that may have been granted or retain access to the application after the user's authorization or role within the application has been deleted or modified. This means once a user's role/account within the application has been modified, deleted or disabled, the changes must be enforced immediately within the application. Any privileges or access the user had prior to the change must not be retained. For example; any application sessions that the user may have already established prior to the configuration change must be terminated when the user account changes occur. Simply removing a user from a web application without terminating any existing application user sessions can introduce a scenario where the deleted user still has access to the application even though their account has been deleted from the authentication store. This can be attributed to browser caching and session management on the web server. To address this, the web application must provide a means for ensuring this type of "zombie" access does not occur. Applications must provide a user management feature or function that will terminate any existing user sessions at the same time or just before the user account is terminated from the authoritative authentication source.

Without path validation, an informed trust decision by the relying party cannot be made when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and DNSSEC. When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor; it can be, for example, a Certification Authority (CA). A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate, typically issued by a trusted CA. This requirement verifies that a certification path to an accepted trust anchor is used for certificate validation and that the path includes status information. Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or online certificate status protocol responses. Validation of the certificate status information is out of scope for this requirement.

If the private key is discovered, an attacker can use the key to authenticate as an authorized user and gain access to the network infrastructure. The cornerstone of the PKI is the private key used to encrypt or digitally sign information. If the private key is stolen, this will lead to the compromise of the authentication and non-repudiation gained through PKI because the attacker can use the private key to digitally sign documents and pretend to be the authorized user. Both the holders of a digital certificate and the issuing authority must protect the computers, storage devices, or whatever they use to keep the private keys.

Without mapping the certificate used to authenticate to a corresponding user account, the ability to determine the identity of the individual user or group will not be available for forensic analysis. Some CAs will include identifying information like an email address within the certificate itself. When the email is assigned to an individual, this helps to identify the individual user who has been assigned the certificate. When identifying information is not available within the certificate itself, the application must provide a mapping that allows administrators to quickly determine who the owner of the certificate is. When responding to a security incident, particularly involving user access violations, time is of the essence so this information must be readily available to investigators.

A local cache of revocation data is also known as a CRL list. This list contains a list of revoked certificates and can be periodically downloaded to ensure certificates can still be checked for revocation when network access is not available or access to the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server is not available. Without configuring a local cache of revocation data, there is the potential to allow access to users who are no longer authorized (users with revoked certificates).

To prevent the compromise of authentication information such as passwords during the authentication process, the feedback from the information system must not provide any information that would allow an unauthorized user to compromise the authentication mechanism. Obfuscation of user-provided information when typed into the system is a method used in addressing this risk. For example, displaying asterisks when a user types in a password is an example of obscuring feedback of authentication information. Another method is to display authentication feedback for a very limited time, usually in fractions of a second. This occurs during password character entry where the password characters are displayed for a very small window of time and then automatically obfuscated. This allows users with just enough time to confirm their password as they type it while limiting the ability of "shoulder surfers" to covertly witness the values. A common tactic employed to circumvent password obfuscation is to copy the obfuscated password and paste it to a text file. Proper obfuscation techniques will not paste the clear text password.

A cryptographic module is a hardware or software device or component that performs cryptographic operations securely within a physical or logical boundary, using a hardware, software or hybrid cryptographic engine contained within the boundary, and cryptographic keys that do not leave the boundary. Based on the criticality of the application, system designers might choose to utilize a hardware based cryptographic module due to the protections and security benefits a hardware based solution provides over a software based solution. Due to various factors, including expense, hardware based encryption modules are usually relegated to only those applications where the system requirements specify it as a required protection. Examples include applications that handle extremely sensitive data or those used in life and death situations, e.g., weapons systems. General purpose applications such as a web site will often opt to leverage an underlying software based encryption capability that is offered by the OS, database or application development framework. Operating systems or database products often provide their own cryptographic modules that are FIPS 140-2 compliant and can meet the authentication to the crypto module requirement via their Role Based Access Controls (users and groups) built into the product. In all cases, user’s accessing the cryptographic module must be authenticated and granted the appropriate rights in order to access the encryption module. Any encryption utilized by the access control mechanisms must be FIPS 140-2 compliant.

Lack of authentication and identification enables non-organizational users to gain access to the application or possibly other information systems and provides an opportunity for intruders to compromise resources within the application or information system. Non-organizational users include all information system users other than organizational users which include organizational employees or individuals the organization deems to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors and guest researchers). Non-organizational users must be uniquely identified and authenticated for all accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization when related to the use of anonymous access, such as accessing a web server.

Access may be denied to authorized users if federal agency PIV credentials are not accepted. Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.

Inappropriate access may be granted to unauthorized users if federal agency PIV credentials are not electronically verified. Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials.

FICAM establishes a federated identity framework for the federal government. FICAM provides government-wide services for common Identity, Credential and Access Management (ICAM) requirements. The FICAM Trust Framework Solutions (TFS) is the federated identity framework for the U.S. federal government. The TFS is a process by which Industry Trust Frameworks (The codification of requirements for credentials and their issuance, privacy and security requirements, as well as auditing qualifications and processes) are evaluated and assessed for potential use by the government. A Trust Framework that is comparable to federal standards is adopted through this process, which allows federal government Relying Parties (Federal Government websites or RP's) to trust Credential Service Providers (a.k.a. Identity Providers) that have been assessed under that particular trust framework. This allows federal government relying parties to trust such credentials at their approved assurance levels. This requirement only applies to applications that are intended to be accessible to nonfederal government agencies and other partners through FICAM. Third-party credentials are those credentials issued by nonfederal government entities approved by the FICAM TFS initiative.

FICAM establishes a federated identity framework for the federal government. FICAM provides governmentwide services for common Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) requirements. The FICAM Trust Framework Solutions (TFS) is the federated identity framework for the U.S. federal government. The TFS is a process by which Industry Trust Frameworks (the codification of requirements for credentials and their issuance, privacy and security requirements, as well as auditing qualifications and processes) are evaluated and assessed for potential use by the government. This requirement only applies to applications intended to be accessible to nonfederal government agencies and other partners or nonorganizational (non-DOD) users. Without conforming to FICAM-issued profiles, the information system may not be interoperable with FICAM-authentication protocols, such as SAML 2.0, OpenID 2.0 or other protocols such as the FICAM backend Attribute Exchange. This requirement addresses open identity management standards. More information regarding these standards is available here: https://www.idmanagement.gov/fpki/#federal-pki-policies-and-profiles

Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. If events associated with non-local administrative access or diagnostic sessions are not logged and audited, a major tool for assessing and investigating attacks would not be available. This requirement addresses auditing-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch).

Privileged access contains control and configuration information which is particularly sensitive, so additional protections are necessary. This is maintained by using cryptographic mechanisms to protect integrity. Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch). The application can meet this requirement through leveraging a cryptographic module.

Privileged access contains control and configuration information which is particularly sensitive, so additional protections are necessary. This is maintained by using cryptographic mechanisms to protect confidentiality. Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. The application can meet this requirement through leveraging a cryptographic module.

Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. If the remote connection is not closed and verified as closed, the session may remain open and be exploited by an attacker; this is referred to as a zombie session. Remote connections must be disconnected and verified as disconnected when non-local maintenance sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.

If maintenance tools are used by unauthorized personnel, they may accidentally or intentionally damage or compromise the system. The act of managing systems and applications includes the ability to access sensitive application information, such as, system configuration details, diagnostic information, user information, and potentially sensitive application data. Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch).

If a maintenance session or connection remains open after maintenance is completed, it may be hijacked by an attacker and used to compromise or damage the system. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system (e.g., the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch).

A race condition is a timing event within an application that can become a security vulnerability. A race condition can occur when a pair of programming calls operating simultaneously do not work in a sequential or coordinated manner. A race condition is a timing event within software that can become a security vulnerability if the calls are not performed in the correct order. There are different types of race conditions and they are dependent upon the action that the application is undertaking when the race condition occurs. Some examples of race conditions include but are not limited to: - Time of check, time of use: the time in which a given resource is checked, and the time that resource is used. - Thread based: two threads of execution use a resource simultaneously, resource may be invalid when used. - Switch based: variable switches values while switch statement is in progress. Developers must be cognizant of programming sequence and use sanity checks to validate data prior to acting upon it. A code review or a static code analysis is the method used to identify race conditions.

Networked applications routinely open connections to and from other systems as part of their design and function. When connections are opened by the application, system resources are consumed. Terminating the network connection at the end of the application session frees up these resources for later use and aids in maintaining system stability. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions includes, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system level network connection. This does not mean that the application terminates all sessions or network access; it only ends the inactive session and releases the resources associated with that session. Many applications rely on the underlying OS to control the network connection aspect of the application which is perfectly acceptable. Additionally, application specific operational issues may occasionally be encountered which dictate exceptions be granted to this requirement in order to ensure continuity of operations and application availability. When the aforementioned type of situation occurs, the root cause of the issue as well as the mitigations implemented in order to prevent a loss of availability must be documented. Common mitigation procedures include but are not limited to stopping and restarting application or system services in order to manually release system resources.

Applications that distribute components of the application must sign the components to provide an identity assurance to consumers of the application component. Components can include application messages or application code. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to validate the author of application components. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance the modules have been tested and validated. If the application resides on a National Security System (NSS) it must not use algorithms weaker than SHA-384.

Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. If the application resides on a National Security System (NSS) it must not use a hashing algorithm weaker than SHA-384.

Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated.

A predictable SessionIndex could lead to an attacker computing a future SessionIndex, thereby, possibly compromising the application. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated.

Application management functionality includes functions necessary for administration and requires privileged user access. Allowing non-privileged users to access application management functionality capabilities increases the risk that non-privileged users may obtain elevated privileges. The separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical and is accomplished by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of the operating system, different network addresses, different TCP/UDP ports, virtualization techniques, combinations of these methods, or other methods, as appropriate. An example of this type of separation is observed in web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. This may include isolating the administrative interface on a different security domain and with additional access controls.

HTTPOnly is a flag included in a Set-Cookie HTTP response header. If the HTTPOnly flag is included in the HTTP response header, the cookie cannot be accessed through client side scripts like JavaScript. If the HTTPOnly flag is set, even if a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in the application exists, and a user accidentally accesses a link that exploits this flaw, the browser will not reveal the cookie to a third party. The HTTPOnly setting is browser dependent however most popular browsers support the feature. If a browser does not support HTTPOnly and a website attempts to set an HTTPOnly cookie, the HTTPOnly flag will be ignored by the browser, thus creating a traditional, script accessible cookie. As a result, the cookie (typically the session cookie) becomes vulnerable to theft or modification by a malicious script running on the client system.

Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, ASP as well as application servers include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework. Setting the secure bit on session cookie ensures the session cookie is only sent via TLS/SSL HTTPS connections. This helps to ensure confidentiality as the session cookie is not able to be viewed by unauthorized parties as it transits the network. Setting the secure flag on all cookies may also be warranted depending upon application design but at a minimum, the session cookie must always be secured.

Authenticity protection provides protection against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information into sessions. Application communication sessions are protected utilizing transport encryption protocols, such as SSL or TLS. SSL/TLS provides web applications with a means to be able to authenticate user sessions and encrypt application traffic. Session authentication can be single (one-way) or mutual (two-way) in nature. Single authentication authenticates the server for the client, whereas mutual authentication provides a means for both the client and the server to authenticate each other. This requirement applies to applications that utilize communications sessions. This includes, but is not limited to, web-based applications and Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA). This requirement addresses communications protection at the application session, versus the network packet, and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Depending on the required degree of confidentiality and integrity, web services/SOA will require the use of SSL/TLS mutual authentication (two-way/bidirectional).

Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, and ASP include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework. Session cookies contain application session information that can be used to impersonate the web application user or hijack their application session. Once the user's session has terminated, these session IDs must be destroyed and not reused.

Session fixation allows an attacker to hijack a valid user’s application session. The attack focuses on the manner in which a web application manages the user’s session ID. Applications become vulnerable when they do not assign a new session ID when authenticating users thereby using the existing session ID. Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, and ASP include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework. In many cases, creating a new session ID cookie containing a new unique value whenever authentication is performed will address the issue of session fixation. Allowing the user to submit a session ID also introduces the risk that the application could be subject to a session fixation attack.

Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, and ASP include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework.

Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, and ASP include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework. Using a session ID that is copied to the URL introduces the risks that the session ID information will be written to log files, made available in browser history files, or made publicly available within the URL. Using cookies to establish session ID information is desired.

Many web development frameworks such as PHP, .NET, and ASP include their own mechanisms for session management. Whenever possible it is recommended to utilize the provided session management framework. Session identifiers are assigned to application users so they can be uniquely identified. This allows the user to customize their web application experience and also allows the developer to differentiate between users thereby providing the opportunity to customize the user’s features and functions. Once a user has logged out of the application or had their session terminated, their session IDs should not be re-used. Session IDs should also not be used for other purposes such as creating unique file names and they should also not be re-assigned to other users once the original user has logged out or otherwise quit the application. Allowing session ID reuse increases the risk of replay attacks. Session testing is a detailed undertaking and is usually done in the course of a web application vulnerability or penetration assessment.

The application server will use session IDs to communicate between modules or applications within the application server and between the application server and users. The session ID allows the application to track the communications along with credentials that may have been used to authenticate users or modules. Unique session IDs are the opposite of sequentially generated session IDs, which can be easily guessed by an attacker. Unique session identifiers help to reduce predictability of those identifiers. Unique session IDs address man-in-the-middle attacks, including session hijacking or insertion of false information into a session. If the attacker is unable to identify or guess the session information related to pending application traffic, they will have more difficulty in hijacking the session or otherwise manipulating valid sessions.

Untrusted Certificate Authorities (CA) can issue certificates, but they may be issued by organizations or individuals that seek to compromise DoD systems or by organizations with insufficient security controls. If the CA used for verifying the certificate is not a DoD-approved CA, trust of this CA has not been established. The DoD will only accept PKI certificates obtained from a DoD-approved internal or external certificate authority. Reliance on CAs for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of SSL/TLS certificates. This requirement focuses on communications protection for the application session rather than for the network packet. This requirement applies to applications that utilize communications sessions. This includes, but is not limited to, web-based applications and Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA).

Failure to a known safe state helps prevent systems from failing to a state that may cause loss of data or unauthorized access to system resources. Applications or systems that fail suddenly and with no incorporated failure state planning may leave the hosting system available but with a reduced security protection capability. Preserving information system state information also facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode of the organization with less disruption of mission-essential processes. In general, application security mechanisms should be designed so that a failure will follow the same execution path as disallowing the operation. For example, security methods, such as isAuthorized(), isAuthenticated(), and validate(), should all return false if there is an exception during processing. If security controls can throw exceptions, they must be very clear about exactly what that condition means. Abort refers to stopping a program or function before it has finished naturally. The term abort refers to both requested and unexpected terminations.

Failure to a known state can address safety or security in accordance with the mission/business needs of the organization. Failure to a known secure state helps prevent a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability in the event of a failure of the information system or a component of the system. Preserving application state information helps to facilitate application restart and return to the operational mode of the organization with less disruption to mission-essential processes.

Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on a secondary storage device (e.g., disk drive and tape drive) within an organizational information system. Mobile devices, laptops, desktops, and storage devices can be either lost or stolen, and the contents of their data storage (e.g., hard drives and non-volatile memory) can be read, copied, or altered. Applications and application users generate information throughout the course of their application use, including data that is stored in areas of volatile memory. Volatile memory must not be overlooked when assigning protections. This requirement addresses protection of user-generated data as well as operating system-specific configuration data. Applications must employ mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, as appropriate, in accordance with the security category and/or classification of the information. This can include segmenting and controlling access to the data, such as using file permissions to restrict access, using role-based controls to restrict access, or applying a cryptographic hash to the data and evaluating hash values for changes made to data.

Applications handling data requiring "data at rest" protections must employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of the information at rest. Selection of a cryptographic mechanism is based on the need to protect the integrity of organizational information. The strength of the mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields).

Applications handling data requiring "data at rest" protections must employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of the information at rest. Selection of a cryptographic mechanism is based on the need to protect the confidentiality of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). Special care must be taken to cryptographically protect classified data.

An isolation boundary provides access control and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that perform security functions. Security functions are the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based. Developers and implementers can increase the assurance in security functions by employing well-defined security policy models; structured, disciplined, and rigorous hardware and software development techniques; and sound system/security engineering principles. Implementation may include isolation of memory space and libraries. Applications restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and by implementing least privilege capabilities.

Applications can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. An example is a web browser with process isolation that provides tabs that are separate processes using separate address spaces to prevent one tab crashing the entire browser.

Preventing unauthorized information transfers mitigates the risk of information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those resources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This requirement generally applies to the design of an information technology product, but it can also apply to the configuration of particular information system components that are, or use, such products. This can be verified by acceptance/validation processes in DoD or other government agencies. There may be shared resources with configurable protections (e.g., files on storage) that may be assessed on specific information system components.

DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. XML-based applications are susceptible to DoS attacks due to the nature of XML parsing being processor intensive and complicated. Best practice for parsing XML to avoid DoS include: - Using a proven XML parser - Using an XML gateway that provides DoS protection - Using parser options that provide limits on recursive payloads, oversized payloads, and entity expansion. This requirement addresses the configuration of applications to mitigate the impact of DoS attacks that have occurred or are ongoing on application availability. For each application, known and potential DoS attacks must be identified and solutions for each type implemented. A variety of technologies exist to limit or, in some cases, eliminate the effects of DoS attacks (e.g., limiting processes or restricting the number of sessions the application opens at one time). Employing increased capacity and bandwidth, combined with service redundancy, may reduce the susceptibility to some DoS attacks.

Denial of Service (DoS) is a condition where a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. Individuals of concern can include hostile insiders or external adversaries that have access or have successfully breached the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyber attacks on the application, the application host or other third-parties. Application developers and application administrators must take the steps needed to ensure an application cannot be used to launch DoS attacks against the application itself, the application host or other systems and networks. Application developers should be cognizant that many attackers using DoS techniques will attempt to identify resource intensive processes and functions within the application. For web applications, this can be application objects that perform database queries or other resource intensive tasks. Improper application memory management can also lead to memory leaks which can exhaust system resources forcing a system or application restart. Limiting attempts to repeatedly execute application processes by validating the requests also reduces the ability to launch some DoS attacks. For application administrators, ensuring network access controls are in place to protect the application host. The methods employed to counter DoS risks are dependent upon the application layer methods that can be used to exploit it.

DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. In the case of application DoS attacks, care must be taken when designing the application to ensure the application makes the best use of system resources. SQL queries have the potential to consume large amounts of CPU cycles if they are not tuned for optimal performance. Web services containing complex calculations requiring large amounts of time to complete can bog down if too many requests for the service are encountered within a short period of time. The methods employed to meet this requirement will vary depending upon the technology the application utilizes. However, a variety of technologies exist to limit or, in some cases, eliminate the effects of application related DoS attacks. Employing increased capacity and bandwidth combined with specialized application layer protection devices and service redundancy may reduce the susceptibility to some DoS attacks.

Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality and integrity may be compromised since unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. This requirement applies to those applications that transmit data, or allow access to data non-locally. Application and data owners have a responsibility for ensuring data integrity and confidentiality is maintained at every step of the data transfer and handling process. Application and data owners need to identify the data that requires cryptographic protection. If no data protection requirements are defined as to what specific data must be encrypted and what data is non-sensitive and doesn't require encryption, all data must be encrypted. When transmitting data, applications need to leverage transmission protection mechanisms, such as TLS, SSL VPNs, or IPSEC. Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., employing physical distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing cryptographic techniques). If physical means of protection are employed, then logical means (cryptography) do not have to be employed, and vice versa.

Data is subject to manipulation and other integrity related attacks whenever that data is transferred across a network. To protect data integrity during transmission, the application must implement mechanisms to ensure the integrity of all transmitted information. All transmitted information means that the protections are not restricted to just the data itself. Protection mechanisms must be extended to include data labels, security parameters, or metadata if data protection requirements specify. Modern web application data transfer methods can be complex and are not necessarily just point-to-point in nature. Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and RESTFUL web services allow for XML-based application data to be transmitted in a manner similar to network traffic wherein the application data is transmitted along multiple servers' hops. In such cases, point-to-point protection methods like TLS or SSL may not be the best choice for ensuring data integrity and alternative data integrity protection methods like XML Integrity Signature protections where the XML payload itself is signed may be required as part of the application design. Overall application design and architecture must always be taken into account when establishing data integrity protection mechanisms. Custom-developed solutions that provide a file transfer capability should implement data integrity checks for incoming and outgoing files. Transmitted information requires mechanisms to ensure the data integrity (e.g., digital signatures, SSL, TLS, or cryptographic hashing).

Data is subject to manipulation and other integrity related attacks whenever that data is transferred across a network. To protect data integrity during transmission, the application must implement mechanisms to ensure the integrity of all transmitted information. All transmitted information means that the protections are not restricted to just the data itself. Protection mechanisms must be extended to include data labels, security parameters or metadata if data protection requirements specify. Modern web application data transfer methods can be complex and are not necessarily just point-to-point in nature. Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and RESTFUL web services allow for XML-based application data to be transmitted in a manner similar to network traffic wherein the application data is transmitted along multiple servers' hops. In such cases, point-to-point protection methods like TLS or SSL may not be the best choice for ensuring data integrity and alternative data integrity protection methods like XML Integrity Signature protections where the XML payload itself is signed may be required as part of the application design. Overall application design and architecture must always be taken into account when establishing data integrity protection mechanisms. Custom-developed solutions that provide a file transfer capability should implement data integrity checks for incoming and outgoing files. Transmitted information requires mechanisms to ensure the data integrity (e.g., digital signatures, SSL, TLS, or cryptographic hashing).

Data is subject to manipulation and other integrity related attacks whenever that data is transferred across a network. To protect data integrity during transmission, the application must implement mechanisms to ensure the integrity of all transmitted information. All transmitted information means that the protections are not restricted to just the data itself. Protection mechanisms must be extended to include data labels, security parameters or metadata if data protection requirements specify. Modern web application data transfer methods can be complex and are not necessarily just point-to-point in nature. Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and RESTFUL web services allow for XML-based application data to be transmitted in a manner similar to network traffic wherein the application data is transmitted along multiple servers' hops. In such cases, point-to-point protection methods like TLS or SSL may not be the best choice for ensuring data integrity and alternative data integrity protection methods like XML Integrity Signature protections where the XML payload itself is signed may be required as part of the application design. Overall application design and architecture must always be taken into account when establishing data integrity protection mechanisms. Custom-developed solutions that provide a file transfer capability should implement data integrity checks for incoming and outgoing files. Transmitted information requires mechanisms to ensure the data integrity (e.g., digital signatures, SSL, TLS, or cryptographic hashing).

Applications should not disclose information not required for the transaction. (e.g., a web application should not divulge the fact there is a SQL server database and/or its version). These events usually occur when the web application has not been configured to send specific error messages for error events. Instead, when a processing anomaly occurs, the application displays technical information about the type of application server, database in use, or other technical details. This provides attackers additional information which they can use to find other attack avenues, or tailor specific attacks, on the application.

Hidden fields allow developers to process application data without having to display it on the screen. Using hidden fields to pass data in forms is a common practice among web applications and by itself is not a security risk. However, hidden fields are not secure and can be easily manipulated by users. Information requiring confidentiality or integrity protections must not be placed in a hidden field. If data that is sensitive must be stored in a hidden field, it must be encrypted. Furthermore, hidden fields used to control access decisions can lead to a complete compromise of access control mechanisms allowing immediate compromise of the user's application session.

XSS attacks are essentially code injection attacks against the various language interpreters contained within the browser. XSS can be executed via HTML, JavaScript, VBScript, ActiveX; essentially any scripting language a browser is capable of processing. XSS vulnerabilities are created when a website does not properly sanitize, escape, or encode user input. For example, "&lt;" is the HTML encoding for the "<" character. If the encoding is performed, the script code will not execute. There are 3 parties involved in an XSS attack, the attacker, the trusted and vulnerable website, and the victim. An attacker will take advantage of a vulnerable website that does not properly validate user input by inserting malicious code into any data entry field. When the victim visits the trusted website and clicks on the malicious link left by the attacker, the attacker’s script is executed in the victims browser with the trust permissions assigned to the site. There are several different types of XSS attack and the complete details regarding XSS cannot be described completely here. To address the issue of XSS, web application developers must escape, encode or otherwise validate all user input that is processed and output by the web server. They should also use web templates or a web development framework that provides the capability to encode or otherwise validate user input. Examples of XSS vulnerabilities can be obtained from the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) website. The site is available by pointing your browser to https://www.owasp.org.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack where a website user is forced to execute an unwanted action on a website that he or she is currently authenticated to. An attacker, through social engineering (e.g., e-mail or chat) creates a hyperlink which executes unwanted actions on the website the victim is authenticated to and sends it to the victim. If the victim clicks on the link, the action is executed unbeknownst to the victim. A CSRF attack executes a website request on behalf of the user which can lead to a compromise of the user’s data. What is needed to be successful is for the attacker to know the URL, an authenticated application user, and trick the user into clicking the malicious link. While XSS is not needed for a CSRF attack to work, XSS vulnerabilities can provide the attacker with a vector to obtain information from the user that may be used in mitigating the risk. The application must not be vulnerable to XSS as an XSS attack can be used to help defeat token, double-submit cookie, referrer and origin-based CSRF defenses.

A command injection attack is an attack on a vulnerable application where improperly validated input is passed to a command shell setup in the application. The result is the ability of an attacker to execute OS commands via the application. A command injection allows an attacker to execute their own commands with the same privileges as the application executing. The following is an example of a URL based command injection attack. Before alteration: http://sitename/cgi-bin/userData.pl?doc=user1.txt Example URL modified: http://sitename/cgi-bin/userData.pl?doc=/bin/ls| The result is the execution of the command “/bin/ls” which could allow the attacker to list contents of the directory via the browser. The following is a list of functions vulnerable to command injection sorted according to language. Language Functions/Characters - C/C++ - system(), popen(), execlp(), execvp(), ShellExecute(), ShellExecuteEx(), _wsystem() - Perl - system, exec, `,open, |, eval, /e - Python - exec, eval, os.system, os.popen, execfile, input, compile - Java - Class.forName(), Class.newInstance(), Runtime.exec()

Canonical representation vulnerabilities can occur when a data conversion process does not convert the data to its simplest form resulting in the possible misrepresentation of the data. The application may behave in an unexpected manner when acting on input that has not been sanitized or normalized. Vulnerable application code is written to expect one form of data and executes its program logic on another form of data thereby creating instability or unexpected behavior. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) website provides test and remediation procedures that can be used for testing if vulnerability scan tools or results are not available. The site is available by pointing your browser to https://www.owasp.org.

Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks. Absence of input validation opens an application to improper manipulation of data. The lack of input validation can lead immediate access of application, denial of service, and corruption of data. Invalid input includes presence of scripting tags within text fields, query string manipulation, and invalid data types and sizes. When an application validates input, it will only execute provided input after it has evaluated the input, validated the input and determined the data is in an expected format, and content is not extraneous or malformed. Comprehensive application security testing and code reviews are required to ensure the application is not vulnerable to input validation vulnerabilities. Application security code reviews should be conducted during the development phase to find and address input validation errors. When code reviews are not possible, fuzz testing can be performed on the application to attempt and identify vulnerable data input fields.

SQL Injection is a code injection attack against database applications. Malicious SQL statements are inserted into an application data entry field where they are submitted to the database and executed. This is a direct result of not validating input that is used by the application to perform a command or execute an action. Successful attacks can read data, write data, execute administrative functions within the database, shutdown the DBMS, and in some cases execute OS commands. Best practices to reduce the potential for SQL Injection vulnerabilities include: Not using concatenation or replacement to build SQL queries. Using prepared statements with parameterized queries that have been tested and validated not to be vulnerable to SQL Injection. Using stored procedures that have been tested and validated not to be vulnerable to SQL Injection. Escaping all user supplied input. Additional steps to prevent SQL Injection can be found at the OWASP website: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

Extensible Markup Language (XML) is widely employed in web technology and applications like web services (SOAP, REST, and WSDL) and is also used for configuration files. XML vulnerability examples include XML injection, XML Spoofing, XML-based Denial of Service attacks and information disclosure attacks. When utilizing XML, web applications must take steps to ensure they are addressing XML-related security issues. This is accomplished by choosing well-designed application components, building application code that follows security best practices and by patching application components when vulnerabilities are identified. XML firewalls or gateways may be employed to assist in protecting applications by controlling access to XML-based applications, filtering XML content, rate-limiting requests, and validating XML traffic.

A common application vulnerability is unpredictable behavior due to improper input validation. This requirement guards against adverse or unintended system behavior caused by invalid inputs, where information system responses to the invalid input may be disruptive or cause the system to fail into an unsafe state. Data received from the user should always be suspected as being malicious and always validated prior to using it as input to the application. Some examples of input methods: - Forms Data - URL parameters - Hidden Fields - Cookies - HTTP Headers or anything in the HTTP request - Client data entry fields Items to validate: - Out of range values/Boundary - Data length - Validate types of characters allowed - Whitelist validation for known good data input while denying all other input. Other recommendations include: - Using drop down menus for lists - Validating input on the server, not on the client. If validating on the client, also validate on the server: - Using regular expressions to validate input - Using HTML filter libraries that implement input validation tasks.

Only authorized personnel should be aware of errors and the details of the errors. Error messages are an indicator of an organization's operational state or can identify application components. Additionally, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and operational information must not be revealed through error messages to unauthorized personnel or their designated representatives. The structure and content of error messages must be carefully considered by the organization and development team. The extent to which the information system is able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Error messages should not include variable names, variable types, SQL strings, or source code. Errors that contain field names from the screen and a description of what should be in the field should not be considered a finding.

Only authorized personnel should be aware of errors and the details of the errors. Error messages are an indicator of an organization's operational state or can identify application components. Additionally, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and operational information must not be revealed through error messages to unauthorized personnel or their designated representatives. The structure and content of error messages must be carefully considered by the organization and development team. The extent to which the information system is able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Error messages should not include variable names, variable types, SQL strings, or source code. Errors that contain field names from the screen and a description of what should be in the field should not be considered a finding.

A buffer overflow occurs when a program exceeds the amount of data allocated to a buffer. The buffer is a sequential section of memory and when the data is written outside the memory bounds, the program can crash or malicious code can be executed. Security safeguards employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism. Buffer overflows can manifest as stack overflows, heap overflows integer overflows and format string overflows. Each type of overflow is dependent upon the underlying application language and the context in which the overflow is executed. Integer overflows can lead to infinite looping when loop index variables are compromised and cause a denial of service. If the integer is used in data references, the data can become corrupt. Also, using the integer in memory allocation can cause buffer overflows, and a denial of service. Integers used in access control mechanisms can potentially trigger buffer overflows, which can be used to execute arbitrary code. Almost all known web servers, application servers, and web application environments are susceptible to buffer overflows. Proper validation of user input is required to mitigate the risk. Notably, limiting the size of the strings a user is allowed to input to a program to a predetermined, acceptable length. A code review, static code analysis or active vulnerability or fuzz testing are methods used to identify overflows within application code.

Previous versions of software components that are not removed from the information system after updates have been installed may be exploited by adversaries. Some information technology products may remove older versions of software automatically from the information system.

Security flaws with software applications are discovered daily. Vendors are constantly updating and patching their products to address newly discovered security vulnerabilities. Organizations (including any contractor to the organization) are required to promptly install security-relevant software updates (e.g., patches, service packs, and hot fixes). Flaws discovered during security assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, or information system error handling must also be addressed expeditiously. Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software may vary based on a variety of factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). This requirement will apply to software patch management solutions that are used to install patches across the enclave and also to applications themselves that are not part of that patch management solution. For example, many browsers today provide the capability to install their own patch software. Patch criticality, as well as system criticality will vary. Therefore, the tactical situations regarding the patch management process will also vary. This means that the time period utilized must be a configurable parameter. Time frames for application of security-relevant software updates may be dependent upon the Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) process. The application, or the patch management solution that is configured to patch the application, must be configured to check for and install security-relevant software updates and patches at least weekly. Patches must be applied immediately or in accordance with POA&Ms, IAVMs, CTOs, DTMs or other authoritative patching guidelines or sources.

Without verification, security functions may not operate correctly and this failure may go unnoticed. Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based. Security functionality includes, but is not limited to, establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. This requirement applies to applications performing security functions and security function verification/testing.

Without verification, security functions may not operate correctly and this failure may go unnoticed. Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based. Security functionality includes, but is not limited to, establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. Notifications provided by information systems include, for example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications, such as lights. This requirement applies to applications performing security functions and the applications performing security function verification/testing.

If personnel are not notified of failed security verification tests, they will not be able to take corrective action and the unsecure condition(s) will remain. Security function is defined as the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based. Security functionality includes, but is not limited to, establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. Notifications provided by information systems include messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications, such as lights. This requirement applies to applications performing security functions and the applications performing security function verification/testing.

Use of un-trusted Level 1A mobile code technologies can introduce security vulnerabilities and malicious code into the client system. 1A code is defined as: - ActiveX controls - Mobile code script (JavaScript, VBScript) - Windows Scripting Host (WSH) (downloaded via URL or email) When JavaScript and VBScript execute within the browser they are Category 3, however, when they execute in WSH, they are 1A.

A comprehensive account management process will ensure that only authorized users can gain access to applications and that individual accounts designated as inactive, suspended, or terminated are promptly deactivated. Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be misused, hijacked, or data compromised.

A tiered application usually consists of 3 tiers, the web layer (presentation tier), the application layer (application logic tier), and the database layer (data storage tier). Using one system for hosting all 3 tiers introduces risk that if one tier is compromised, there are no additional protection layers available to defend the other tiers. Security controls must be in place in order to provide different levels and types of defenses for each type of server based upon data protection requirements identified by policy or data owner. DoD DMZ policy specifies that logical separation is allowed but when hosting different data types on the same server, physical separation is required. 1) Unrestricted web servers and Restricted web servers must be on separate virtual or physical servers from Private web servers, application servers, or database servers. 2) Unrestricted web servers and Restricted web servers can either be on separate physical servers from each other, or they can be on separate virtual servers. 3) If application and database servers have been separated by service type into Unrestricted, Restricted, and Private servers (permitted but not required in Increment 1 Phase 1), they must be on separate virtual or physical servers from each other by server type (Application or Database) and by service type (Unrestricted, Restricted, or Private). Reference the DoD DMZ STIG for details on data types and separation requirements. Security controls include firewalls or other forms of access controls that restrict the ability to traverse the network from one system to the other. Separation can be performed either physically or logically based upon data protection and application protection design requirements. Physically separate networks require distinct physical network devices for connections (e.g., two separate switches or two separate routers). Physically separate machines utilize a non-virtual OS. Logically separate networks are usually implemented via a VLAN. Logically separate systems are implemented with virtual machines or other system emulation. Security controls are firewall rules or ACLs that provide access restrictions on network traffic and limit communications between systems to only application and application/system support traffic. For complete explanation of DoD DMZ requirements, reference DoD DMZ requirements.

Log files are a requirement to trace intruder activity or to audit user activity.

Without access control the data is not secure. It can be compromised, misused, or changed by unauthorized access at any time.

Violations of IA policies must be reviewed and reported. If there are no policies regarding the reporting of IA violations, IA violations may not be tracked or addressed in a proper manner.

Use of automated scanning tools accompanied with manual testing/validation which confirms or expands on the automated test results is an accepted best practice when performing application security testing. Automated scanning tools expedite and help to standardize security testing, they can incorporate known attack methods and procedures, test for libraries and other software modules known to be vulnerable to attack and utilize a test method known as "fuzz testing". Fuzz testing is a testing process where the application is provided invalid, unexpected, or random data. Poorly designed and coded applications will become unstable or crash. Properly designed and coded applications will reject improper and unexpected data input from application clients and remain stable. Many vulnerability scanning tools provide automated fuzz testing capabilities for the testing of web applications. All of these tools help to identify a wide range of application vulnerabilities including, but not limited to; buffer overflows, cross-site scripting flaws, denial of service format bugs and SQL injection, all of which can lead to a successful compromise of the system or result in a denial of service. Due to changes in the production environment, it is a good practice to schedule periodic active testing of production web applications. Ideally, this will occur prior to deployment and after updates or changes to the application production environment. It is imperative that automated scanning tools are configured properly to ensure that all of the application components that can be tested are tested. In the case of web applications, some of the application code base may be accessible on the website and could potentially be corrected by a knowledgeable system administrator. Active testing is different from code review testing in that active testing does not require access to the application source code base. A code review requires complete code base access and is normally performed by the development team. If vulnerability testing is not conducted, there is the distinct potential that security vulnerabilities could be unknowingly introduced into the application environment. The following website provides an overview of fuzz testing and examples: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fuzzing

In order to understand data flows within web services, the process flow of data must be developed and documented. There are several different ways that web service deadlock occurs, many times it is due to when a client invokes a synchronous method on a web service, the client will block waiting for the method to complete. If attempts to call the client (invoke a callback) while the client is waiting for the original method to complete, then each party will deadlock waiting for the other. This is referred to as deadlock. The same situation could occur if a callback handler attempted to call a synchronous method on its caller. Applications that utilize web services must account for and document how they deal with a deadlock issue. This can be accomplished by documenting data flow and specifically accounting for the risk in the design of the application.

Application configuration settings and user data are required to be stored in separate locations in order to prevent application users from possibly being able to access application configuration settings or application data files. Without proper access controls and separation of application configuration settings from user data, there is the potential that existing code or configuration settings could be changed by users. These changes in code can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or allow malicious code to be placed within the application. In addition, collocating application data and code complicates many issues such as backup, recovery, directory access privilege, and upgrades.

Not all COTS products are covered by a STIG. Those products not covered by a STIG, should follow commercially accepted best practices, independent testing results and vendors lock down guides and recommendations if they are available.

Failure to comply with DoD Ports, Protocols, and Services (PPS) Vulnerability Analysis and associated PPS mitigations may result in compromise of enclave boundary protections and/or functionality of the application.

Failure to register the applications usage of ports, protocols, and services with the DoD PPS Database may result in a Denial of Service (DoS) because of enclave boundary protections at other end points within the network.

A Configuration Management (CM) repository is used to manage application code versions and to securely store application code. Failure to properly apply security patches and secure the software Configuration Management system could affect the confidentiality and integrity of the application source-code. Compromise of the Configuration Management system could lead to unauthorized changes to applications including the addition of malware, root kits, back doors, logic bombs or other malicious functions into valid application code. This requirement is intended to be applied to application developers or organizations responsible for code management or who have and operate an application CM repository.

A Configuration Management (CM) repository is used to manage application code versions and to securely store application code. Incorrect access privileges to the CM repository can lead to malicious code or unintentional code being introduced into the application. This requirement is intended to be applied to application developers or organizations responsible for code management or who have and operate an application CM repository.

Software Configuration Management (SCM) is very important in tracking code releases, baselines, and managing access to the configuration management repository. The SCM plan identifies what should be under configuration management control. Without an SCM plan that addresses code security issues, code releases can be tracked and vulnerabilities can be inserted intentionally or unintentionally into the code base of the application. This requirement is intended to be applied to application developers or organizations responsible for code management or who have and operate an application configuration management repository (CMR). The SCM plan identifies all objects created during the development process subject to configuration control. The SCM plan maintains procedures for identifying individual application components, as well as, entire application releases during all phases of the software development lifecycle. The SCM plan identifies and tracks all actions and changes resulting from a change request from initiation to release. The SCM plan contains procedures to identify, document, review, and authorize any change requests to the application. The SCM plan defines the responsibilities, the actions to be performed, the tools, techniques and methodologies, and defines an initial set of baselined software components. The SCM plan objects have security classifications labels. The SCM plan identifies tools and version numbers used in the software development lifecycle. The SCM plan identifies mechanisms for controlled access of simultaneous individuals updating the same application component. The SCM plan assures only authorized changes by authorized persons are possible. The SCM plan identifies mechanisms to control access and audit changes between different versions of objects subject to configuration control. The SCM plan identifies mechanisms to track and audit all modifications of objects under configuration control. Audits include the originator and date and time of the modification. The SCM plan should contain the following: - Description of the configuration control and change management process - Types of objects developed - Roles and responsibilities of the organization The SCM plan should also contain the following: - Defined responsibilities - Actions to be performed - Tools used in the process - Techniques and methodologies - Initial set of baselined software components The SCM plan should identify all objects that are under configuration management control. The SCM plan should identify third-party tools and respective version numbers. The SCM plan should identify mechanisms for controlled access of individuals simultaneously updating the same application component. The SCM plan assures only authorized changes by authorized persons are allowed. The SCM plan should identify mechanisms to control access and audit changes between different versions of objects subject to configuration control. The SCM plan should have procedures for label versions of application components and application builds under configuration management control. The configuration management repository (CMR) should track change requests from beginning to end. The configuration management repository (CMR) should authorize change requests to the application. The configuration management repository (CMR) should contain security classification labels for code and documentation in the repository. Classification labels are not applicable to unclassified systems. The configuration management repository (CMR) should monitor all objects under CMR control for auditing.